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The three essays in this dissertation focus on the impacts of work incentives 
geared towards two very different segments of the labor market.  The first essay, “Does 
Incentive Pay Alter Physician Effort? An Analysis of the Time and Treatment that 
Physicians Provide to Patients,” examines the link between incentive pay and effort 
among a group of highly-skilled workers: physicians.  The other two essays, “Exiting 
TANF in South Carolina after the Deficit Reduction Act” and “What Happened to Cash 
Assistance for Needy Families,” focus on a group of generally low-skilled, low-wage 
workers: welfare recipients.  “Exiting TANF in South Carolina after the Deficit 
Reduction Act” examines the impact of a recent welfare reform aimed at promoting 
employment and self-sufficiency on durations of welfare recipiency.  “What Happened to 
Cash Assistance for Needy Families?” identifies trends in welfare recipiency and self-
sufficiency over the past twenty years. 
While a number of studies have attempted to measure the impact of financial 
incentives on physician behavior, none has examined the impact of performance-based 
incentive pay on broad measures of physician effort.  In “Does Incentive Pay Alter 
Physician Effort? An Analysis of the Time and Treatment that Physicians Provide to 
Patients,” I use newly available data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey 
from 2006 through 2008 to estimate the effect of three specific types of performance-
based incentive pay – productivity incentives, patient-centered incentives, and practice 
profiling incentives – on both the time physicians spend with patients and the intensity 
 
 
with which physicians treat patients.  Using a discrete factor approximation approach to 
control for the endogeneity of incentive pay, I am able to estimate the impact of these 
types of incentive pay on physician effort.  I find that performance-based incentive pay is 
associated with physicians spending significantly less time with each patient.  I also find 
some evidence that performance-based incentive pay impacts physicians’ intensity of 
treatment. 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) narrowed and standardized the work 
and work readiness activities that satisfy the work requirement of the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.  In “Exiting TANF in South Carolina 
after the Deficit Reduction Act,” I use administrative data from South Carolina’s TANF 
program and employ event history techniques with a difference-in-difference estimation 
framework to analyze the effect of this policy change.  I find that the DRA’s definition of 
work and work readiness activities reduced the likelihood of black recipients to exit the 
TANF program in South Carolina while increasing the likelihood of exit for non-black 
recipients.  For blacks, this decrease in the hazard comes from a decrease in the 
likelihood of exit through employment.  For non-blacks, the result stems from an increase 
in the hazards for administrative exits and for other income exits.  I also find that the 
reform led to longer durations of TANF benefit receipt in South Carolina for black 
recipients and shorter durations of cash assistance for non-black recipients. 
A primary goal of welfare reform since the early 1990’s has been to increase the 
self-sufficiency of welfare recipients.  The essay “What Happened to Cash Assistance for 
Needy Families?,” coauthored with David. C. Ribar, examines trends in the 
 
 
characteristics and outcomes for recipient families to determine if welfare recipients are 
becoming more self-sufficient.  Using annual public use data on AFDC and TANF 
households from the Department of Health and Human Services, we find both positive 
and negative trends over the past twenty years.  We find that the size of the caseload has 
decreased, the fraction of the caseload with earned income has increased, and the average 
earnings of welfare recipients has increased.  On the other hand, we find that the fraction 
of child-only cases has increased, the caseload has disproportionately dropped the least-
skilled households, average benefits fell faster than earnings grew, and the majority of 
households that exit TANF have no earnings. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The three essays in this dissertation focus on the impacts of work incentives 
geared towards two very different segments of the labor market.  The first essay, “Does 
Incentive Pay Alter Physician Effort? An Analysis of the Time and Treatment that 
Physicians Provide to Patients,” examines the link between incentive pay and effort 
among a group of highly-skilled workers: physicians.  The other two essays, “Exiting 
TANF in South Carolina after the Deficit Reduction Act” and “What Happened to Cash 
Assistance for Needy Families,” focus on a group of generally low-skilled, low-wage 
workers: welfare recipients.  “Exiting TANF in South Carolina after the Deficit 
Reduction Act” examines the impact of a recent welfare reform aimed at promoting 
employment and self-sufficiency on durations of welfare recipiency.  “What Happened to 
Cash Assistance for Needy Families?” identifies trends in welfare recipiency and self-
sufficiency of welfare recipients over the past twenty years. 
 While a number of studies have attempted to measure the impact of financial 
incentives on physician behavior, none has examined the impact of performance-based 
incentive pay on broad measures of physician effort.  In “Does Incentive Pay Alter 
Physician Effort? An Analysis of the Time and Treatment that Physicians Provide to 
Patients,” I use newly available data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey 
from 2006 through 2008 to estimate the effect of three specific types of performance-
2 
 
based incentive pay – productivity incentive pay, patient-centered incentive pay, and 
practice profiling incentive pay – on both the time physicians spend with patients and the 
intensity with which physicians treat patients.  Each of these measures of performance-
based incentive pay rewards a physician with a payment for meeting the specified 
performance goal.   
Using a discrete factor approximation approach to control for the endogeneity of 
incentive pay, I am able to estimate the impact of these types of incentive pay on 
physician effort.  I find productivity incentive pay is associated with physicians spending 
approximately two minutes (9.4 percent) less with each patient, on average.  If a 
physician reduces his time spent with each patient from the average of 21 minutes and 47 
seconds to 19 minutes and 43 seconds, in an eight hour workday he will see two 
additional patients.  If, however, time spent with the patient is a proxy for quality, 
productivity incentive pay that increases overall physician effort by decreasing per-
patient effort comes at the expense of the quality of medical care received by the patient.  
I find little evidence that patient-centered or practice profiling incentive pay impacts the 
amount of time a physician spends with his patients, but I do find evidence of unobserved 
heterogeneity leading to positive selection bias in the coefficient estimates for patient-
centered and practice profiling incentive pay in the model for time spent with patients.   
I also find some evidence that performance-based incentive pay impacts 
physicians’ intensity of treatment.  Patient-centered incentive pay appears to reduce 
treatment intensity while practice profiling incentive pay seems to increase treatment 
intensity. 
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The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) narrowed and standardized the work 
and work readiness activities that satisfy the work requirement of the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.  In “Exiting TANF in South Carolina 
after the Deficit Reduction Act,” I use administrative data from South Carolina’s TANF 
program and employ event history techniques with a difference-in-difference estimation 
framework to analyze the effect of this policy change.  In particular, I examine the impact 
of the reform on the likelihood of exit from the TANF program and on the paths to exit 
from the TANF program in South Carolina.  Using these results, I conduct simulations to 
determine how the reform impacted the duration of benefit receipt in South Carolina. 
  I find that, during the first four months of a spell, the DRA’s definition of work 
and work readiness activities reduced the likelihood of black recipients to exit the TANF 
program in South Carolina while increasing the likelihood of exit for non-black 
recipients.  I also find that the reform reduced the likelihood of exit due to employment 
for blacks at the beginning of a spell while increasing the likelihood of exit due to other 
sources of income or due to administrative reasons for non-blacks.  Finally, I find that the 
reform led to longer durations of TANF benefit receipt in South Carolina for black 
recipients and shorter durations of cash assistance for non-black recipients. 
The primary goal of welfare reform since the early 1990’s has been to increase the 
self-sufficiency of welfare recipients.  The essay “What Happened to Cash Assistance for 
Needy Families?” examines trends in the characteristics and outcomes for recipient 
families to determine if welfare recipients are becoming more self-sufficient.  Using 
annual public use data on AFDC and TANF households from the Department of Health 
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and Human Services, we find both positive and negative trends over the past twenty 
years.  We find that the size of the caseload has decreased, the fraction of the caseload 
with earned income has increased, and the average earnings of welfare recipients has 
increased.  On the other hand, we find that the fraction of child-only cases has increased, 
the caseload has disproportionately dropped the least-skilled households, average benefits 
fell faster than earnings grew, and the majority of households that exit TANF have no 
earnings.   
We also find that the general well-being of those at risk of becoming dependent 
on welfare increased during the 1990s but declined from 2000 to 2008.  The poverty rate 
of single mothers declined from 47 percent in 1991 to 33 percent in 2000 but increased to 
37 percent by 2008.  The employment rate of single mothers increased from 56 percent in 
1990 to 63 percent by 200 but dropped to about 60 percent by 2008.  Finally, of the 23.7 
million people living below the poverty line in 2008, TANF only reached 3.7 million. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
DOES INCENTIVE PAY ALTER PHYSICIAN EFFORT? 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TIME AND TREATMENT  
THAT PHYSICIANS PROVIDE TO PATIENTS 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
With the recent trend towards pay-for-performance initiatives in healthcare, the 
American Medical Association has pushed for physicians to take a more active role in 
ensuring they receive the appropriate share of pay-for-performance bonuses (Elliott, 
2012).  As physicians alter their effort in response to these incentives, it is likely to 
impact the cost and quality of medical care.  This paper examines the effect of 
performance-based incentive pay on quantitative measures of physician effort: the 
amount of time that a physician spends with a patient and two measures of the intensity 
with which the physician treats the patient.  A decrease in either of these components of 
per-patient physician effort would be associated with a decrease in the cost of medical 
care and, potentially, a decrease in the quality of medical care.   
A large breadth of literature in both the economics and healthcare fields attempts 
to measure the impact of financial incentives on physician behavior, and much of this 
literature falls naturally into two groups.1  The first group of studies examines the impact 
of physicians’ quality of care (QOC) and productivity performance-based incentive pay 
(i.e. rewarding physicians with higher pay for meeting some performance goal) on 
                                                          
1 For a review of studies on the impact of incentive pay in other labor markets, see Prendergast (1999) and 
Lazear (2000). 
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process-of-care outcomes, such as rates of immunization or screening for disease; 
however, in focusing on very specific process of care outcomes, these studies can only 
account for the impact of incentive pay on a limited component of physician effort.  A 
second group of studies examines the effect of reimbursement methods (i.e. the methods 
by which insurers pay for services rendered) on broader measures of physician effort; 
however, reimbursement incentives are only one of many types of financial incentives 
that physicians face.2   
What is lacking in the literature is a study of the impact of performance-based 
incentive pay on broad measures of per-patient physician effort.  We know from the 
literature on reimbursement incentives that physicians do respond broadly to financial 
incentives; however, many physicians work as salaried employees in medical groups.  
These salaried group physicians are shielded from reimbursement incentives, but they are 
subject to the group’s performance-based incentive pay.  Further, even incentive pay 
targeted at narrowly defined aspects of physician effort may have spillover effects, 
resulting in a broader impact on physician effort than intended.  Thus, it is important to 
consider the broad impacts of incentive pay on physician effort. 
 In this paper, I examine the effect of three types of performance-based incentive 
pay on the amount of time physicians spend with each patient and on two measures of the 
                                                          
2 Three common forms of reimbursement are capitation, fee-for-service (FFS), and salary.  Under capitated 
reimbursement, the physician or medical group receives a set monthly payment for each patient on the 
roster, regardless of the services provided.  Under FFS reimbursement, the physician or medical group is 
paid a previously agreed upon fee for each service rendered.  Under salary reimbursement, the physician 
receives a fixed salary regardless of the number of patients under his care or the services rendered for those 
patients. 
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intensity of the physicians’ treatment.  Examining both the time and intensity of treatment 
is critical to understanding the full effect of performance-based incentive pay.  Further, I 
model the selection of physicians into performance-based incentive pay using a discrete 
factor approximation approach, thus addressing a source of selection bias that may be 
present due to the endogeneity of incentive pay.  I find strong evidence that performance-
based incentive pay reduces the amount of time physicians spend with each patient.  I 
also find weaker evidence that incentive pay impacts physicians’ intensity of treatment. 
 This paper contributes to the literature in three ways.  First, I examine the impact 
of performance-based incentive pay, including two types of incentive pay not considered 
by previous studies, on three broad measures of physician effort.  Second, I use newly 
available data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) on the 
performance-based incentive pay received by each physician as well as data on the effort 
exerted by the physicians in treating each patient.  Third, I employ a discrete factor 
methodology to control for unobserved heterogeneity that would otherwise bias the 
results. 
2.  Literature 
In their seminal paper, Gaynor and Pauly (1990) find that when the medical group 
compensation structure provides physicians with the incentive to see more patients, 
physicians respond by increasing the number of patients they treat each week.  Many 
subsequent empirical studies have attempted to measure the impact of different types of 
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financial incentives on physician effort.3  One body of literature examines the impact of 
physicians’ performance-based incentive pay on process-of-care outcomes, with a focus 
on two types of performance-based incentive pay: that targeted at improving quality of 
care outcomes and that targeted at improving productivity.  A second body of literature 
examines the impacts of reimbursement incentives on broader measures of physician 
effort, such as time spent with patients and intensity of treatment.  I review each of these 
in turn. 
Quality of care performance-based incentive pay consists of financial rewards 
paid to physicians who meet some clinical performance or quality goal, often associated 
with preventive care (e.g. rates of immunization or disease screening).  The literature on 
physician QOC performance-based incentive pay has generated equivocal evidence that 
this type of incentive alters physician effort.4  For instance, Fairbrother et al. (1999, 
2001) find that QOC incentive pay rewarding a physician for childhood immunization 
leads to better documentation of immunizations received outside the physician’s practice 
but has little impact on the number of immunizations actually administered by the 
physician.  Beaulieu and Horrigan (2005) find that QOC incentive pay combined with 
education and healthcare management tools is associated with greater levels of physician 
effort for diabetes patients.  Finally, Grady et al. (1997) find no evidence that physician 
QOC incentive pay impacts mammography referral rates.   
                                                          
3 In addition, Grumbach et al. (1998) show that financial incentives have a psychological impact on 
physicians. 
4 A larger body of literature on the impact of QOC performance-based incentive pay for medical groups on 
individual physician effort has also found weak results.  See Petersen et al. (2006) or Rosenthal and Frank 
(2006) for a review as well as Campbell et al. (2007), Mullen et al. (2010), and Rosenthal et al. (2005). 
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Productivity performance-based incentive pay rewards physicians for providing a 
greater quantity of services (e.g. office visits).  Wee et al. (2001) find that productivity 
performance-based incentive pay is associated with physicians providing lower levels of 
some types of preventive care (such as Pap smears and cholesterol screens) but has no 
impact on other processes of preventive care.  A common weakness of Beaulieu and 
Horrigan (2005) and Wee et al. (2001) is that these studies may suffer from multiple 
sources of bias, including unobserved heterogeneity, and thus caution should be taken in 
interpreting the results as causal. 
The studies of reimbursement incentives provide stronger evidence that 
physicians alter their effort in response to these incentives, as reimbursement schemes 
with fewer positive incentives, such as capitation, are found to be associated with lower 
amounts of overall and per-patient physician effort.  For example, both Balkrishnan et al. 
(2002) and Melichar (2009), using patient-level data from the NAMCS, find that 
physicians spend about one minute less with capitated patients than with other patients.5  
Similarly, many studies find that fee-for-service (FFS) physicians conduct more patient 
visits than those under a reimbursement system with fewer positive incentives (Devlin 
and Sarma, 2008; Grytten et al., 2009; Sarma et al., 2010; and Sorensen and Grytten, 
2003).  Shafrin (2010) finds that reimbursing a specialist via FFS is associated with a 
greater number of surgeries, and Dumont et al. (2008) find that when physicians switch 
from FFS to a less incentive-based reimbursement scheme, they reduce their volume of 
                                                          
5 It is interesting that while Melichar (2009) uses fixed effects to control for physician selection into 
reimbursement schemes and Balkrishnan et al. (2002) do not account for such selection, both studies find 
the same effect. 
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clinical services provided.  On the other hand, Balkrishnan et al. (2002) find that 
physicians provide more counseling and education services for capitated patients.  In a 
related study, Glied and Zivin (2002) find that the average time spent with a patient is 
shorter in HMO-dominated practices; however, the number of tests and number of 
medications provided is larger.   
It is clear from the literature that physicians respond broadly to reimbursement 
incentives by altering their overall and per-patient levels of effort; however, it is still 
unclear as to whether and how physicians respond to other types of financial incentives, 
specifically performance-based incentive pay.  There is a lack of consensus in the 
literature on the effect of QOC and productivity performance-based incentive pay on 
quantitative process of care outcomes.  Further, to my knowledge, there has been no 
previous examination of the effect of QOC and productivity performance-based incentive 
pay on broad measures of per-patient physician effort nor has there been much study of 
the effects of practice profiling or patient satisfaction performance-based incentive pay 
on any form of physician effort.  A clear understanding of these effects, as I provide in 
this study, may aid in interpreting the impact of physicians’ incentive pay on the cost and 
quality of healthcare in the United States. 
3.  Conceptual Framework 
 There are a number of reasons why a physician might face performance-based 
incentive pay, and each of these has a unique implication for the effect of performance-
based incentive pay on physician effort.  In this section, I develop a conceptual 
framework demonstrating why a medical group may want to contract with physicians on 
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effort.  I then propose three applications of performance-based incentive pay in this 
framework and discuss the implications for physician effort in each application. 
Consider an individual physician employed by a medical group, and suppose that 
the physician’s objective is to maximize his utility, which is increasing in income and 
decreasing in effort.  Also suppose that the medical group’s objective is to maximize 
profit, which is a function of the medical services provided by each physician and the 
income paid to each physician employed by the group.  The medical services provided by 
a physician may include office visits as well as any tests or procedures performed by the 
physician.  The quantity of medical services provided is an increasing function of the 
physician’s overall level of effort; thus the medical group’s profit is increasing in overall 
physician effort.6 
 Suppose that overall physician effort may be divided into two components: the 
number of patients treated and the intensity of the treatment.  Each of these components 
will have a separate impact on the medical group’s profit.  Consider first the number of 
patients treated, assuming that hours worked each day is exogenous, that the price to 
patients of an office visit is independent of physician effort, and that the physician is 
operating under a full schedule (i.e. the physician does not have any extra time in his 
                                                          
6 The distinction between “overall” and “per-patient” physician effort is important here.  Gaynor and Pauly 
(1990) assume that a physician can increase the medical services provided, and thus increase revenue, by 
increasing his per-patient level of effort.  While this may be true for solo practitioners, physicians working 
in a medical group often have exogenous constraints placed on them by the group, and these constraints 
may limit a physician’s ability to raise revenue through increases in per-patient effort.  This is particularly 
relevant when thinking about effort in terms of the physician’s time spent with patients. 
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workday to see additional patients without decreasing the time spent with each patient).7  
In this case, the physician may be able to increase his overall level of effort by decreasing 
his per-patient level of effort: reducing the amount of time spent with each patient so as 
to see more patients each day.8  By seeing more patients each day, the physician has 
increased the quantity of medical services provided, leading to an increase in the group’s 
profit. 
 Now consider the second component of physician effort: the intensity of 
treatment.  In this paper, I think of intensity of treatment as how aggressive the physician 
is in treating the patient.  Does the physician order a battery of tests or perform any 
procedures?  Many of the services embodied in treatment intensity carry a price in 
addition to the price for an office visit; thus, increasing the intensity of treatment will 
increase the medical services provided and consequently, the group’s profit. 
 Given the above assumptions, a profit-maximizing medical group will have a 
keen interest in the effort levels exerted by the physicians it employs.  As such, there are 
a number of reasons as to why a medical group may use incentive pay to try to alter the 
physicians’ levels of effort, and I discuss three of these reasons in the following 
                                                          
7 Hours of work can be thought of as being exogenous if one assumes that it is decided on by the group 
rather than by the individual physician.  This assumption seems reasonable as the group, not the individual 
physician, is choosing the levels of non-physician labor and capital, which the individual physician takes as 
exogenous.  Just as the group may choose to employ the receptionist for eight hours each day, the group 
may choose to keep the medical office suite open for eight hours each day, which limits the time a 
physician can work to only eight hours.  This assumption is further supported by the inability of Gaynor 
and Pauly (1990) to reject the exogeneity of physician hours in the production function. 
8 This result relies on the assumption that the physician is operating under a full schedule.  If, on the other 
hand, the physician has idle time during his workday in which he is not seeing patients, he could increase 
the number of patients treated without decreasing his time spent with each patient. 
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subsections.  This list is not meant to be exhaustive but simply to illustrate the potential 
uses of incentive pay in medical group practices. 
 3.1  Moral Hazard 
 The first reason for why a medical group may use incentive pay is to correct for 
moral hazard.  For example, if the group could contract with the physician on income and 
effort, the optimal level of physician effort could be reached; however, physician effort 
may be subject to discretion on the part of the physician based on patient characteristics, 
a patient’s history with the physician, and physician preferences, making contracting on 
effort difficult in the healthcare field.  This difficulty could present the physician with the 
opportunity to shirk, providing a level of effort that is not optimal from the medical 
group’s perspective.  It may be possible for a medical group to use incentive pay to 
reduce this moral hazard and better align the objectives of the group and the physician so 
that the level of effort exerted by the physician is closer to the optimal level.  The practice 
could pay the physician a performance-based incentive for certain verifiable types of 
revenue-generating effort, such as the number of patients seen each day (e.g. a 
productivity incentive).  This incentive will offset some of the disutility associated with 
the increase in overall effort while inducing the physician to spend less time with each 
patient so as to see more patients each day. 
 3.2  Patient Well-being and Induced Demand 
 A second reason for why a medical group may use incentive pay is to induce 
demand.  Suppose the group’s objective is as before but now the physician cares about 
the well-being of his patients.  In this case, the physician’s objective is to maximize 
14 
 
utility with respect to income and patient well-being, where his utility is increasing in 
both income and patient well-being.  The medical group, on the other hand, is only 
concerned about profit and prefers that patients consume greater quantities of medical 
services without consideration for patient well-being.  If providing medical care to 
optimize the well-being of the patient is not consistent with profit maximization, the 
medical group may use incentive pay tied to the number or pattern of profitable medical 
services that a physician provides to his patients (e.g. a productivity or practice profiling 
incentive), inducing the physician to provide more revenue-generating medical services, 
such as office visits (by reducing the amount of time spent with each patient), diagnostic 
and screening services, and procedures. 
 3.3  Patient Satisfaction 
 A third reason for why a medical group may use incentive pay is to increase 
patient satisfaction.  In seeking to maximize the current and expected future stream of 
profit, suppose the medical group cares about patient satisfaction, as more satisfied 
patients will be more likely to return to the practice and consume additional medical 
services in the future.  Also suppose that the physician does not care about patient 
satisfaction.9  If patient satisfaction is an increasing function of per-patient physician 
effort, the objectives of the practice and the physician will be at odds.  The medical group 
could provide the physician with incentive pay tied to current patient satisfaction (e.g. a 
patient satisfaction or quality of care incentive) in order to offset his disutility associated 
                                                          
9 This does not preclude the physician from wanting to maximize the patient’s well-being.  Rather it 
assumes that what is in the patient’s best interest medically and what the patient prefers are not necessarily 
the same. 
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with effort.  This could induce the physician to provide a higher level of per-patient effort 
by spending more time with each patient, providing more diagnostic and screening 
services, and performing more procedures. 
 3.4  Implications 
 Each of these motivations for incentive pay has implications for physician effort.  
First, productivity incentive pay aimed at resolving moral hazard will serve to offset 
some of the disutility associated with an increase in overall physician effort.  Thus, 
productivity incentive pay should reduce the amount of time a physician spends with 
each patient so that the physician is able to see more patients each day.  Second, 
productivity or practice profiling incentive pay aimed at promoting induced demand will 
induce the physician to provide more revenue generating services.  This should also 
reduce the amount of time a physician spends with each patient so as to increase the 
number of office visits, and it should increase the intensity of treatment so as to increase 
the quantity of other services provided (such as diagnostic and screening services and 
procedures).  Finally, patient satisfaction or quality of care incentive pay aimed at 
increasing patient satisfaction should cause the physician to increase his effort in ways 
that patients value.  If patients value time with the physician and greater treatment 
intensity, the physician will respond by increasing these components of his effort.   
4.  Data 
The data used in this essay come from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s 2006, 2007, and 2008 National Ambulatory Medical Care Surveys 
(NAMCS), which randomly samples and interviews office-based physicians to collect 
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information on the physicians and on a sample of the patients they treat during a one-
week reporting period.10  The data collected on physicians include information such as 
employment status, the types of incentive pay received, and the services provided by the 
medical group.  The information collected on the physicians’ patients comes directly 
from the patients’ charts and includes the number of minutes the physicians spent with 
each patient and the services ordered or performed by the physicians as well as 
information on the patient’s health and demographics.  These data are particularly well 
suited for this analysis because they not only contain information on per-patient physician 
effort from the patients’ charts, but they also contain data on the types of incentive pay 
physicians receive, available only in the 2006, 2007, and 2008 survey years.  Combining 
the three survey years of NAMCS data yields an initial dataset with 3,811 physicians and 
90,911 patient-level observations. 
A challenge to analyzing the data in this analysis, however, is that they are 
observed at two different levels: the measures of physician effort are observed at the 
patient-level while the incentive pay variables are observed at the physician-level.  
Because I do not observe patient-specific incentive pay, I aggregate the patient-level data 
up to the physician level by averaging over all patients for each physician.  If the 
physician receives incentive pay for meeting a targeted level of effort across (or averaged 
over) all patients, then this approach is appropriate because one would not expect the 
                                                          
10 The sampling procedure uses the physician’s expectations over the number of days he will see patients 
and the total number of patients he will see during the week to select approximately 30 patient visits from 
each sampled physician.  However, due to error in the physicians’ expectations and non-participation, 
approximately 24 patient record forms were completed on average for each physician from 2006 to 2008. 
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response to vary systematically across patients.  On the other hand, if this assumption is 
incorrect and physicians do indeed face different incentive pay for different groups of 
patients (e.g. patients with particular insurance plans), this model assumes a uniform 
response to incentives across all patients treated rather than a patient-type-specific 
response.11  One example where assuming a uniform response may not be appropriate is 
incentive pay that differs across patients with public versus private insurance due to the 
differences that exist in reimbursement; thus, I model the impact of performance-based 
incentive pay on physician effort separately for private insurance, Medicare, and 
Medicaid patients. 
I exclude from the analysis to patients who pay for their care out-of-pocket, as my 
assumption regarding the patient’s price of an office visit being independent of physician 
effort may not be valid for patients who pay for their care out-of-pocket.  I omit patients 
from the sample if they saw a provider other than the physician, as the physician’s 
incentive pay can have no effect on his effort if he is not the one treating the patient.  The 
2,647 patients in the sample who saw a provider other than the physician have a time 
value of zero; dropping these observations removes the left-censoring of this outcome 
variable.  I also omit the 23,395 patient-level observations where time spent with the 
                                                          
11 This is more likely to be the case if the incentive payments are paid by a third-party payer rather than by 
the medical group.  This may not be cause for concern, however, as Glied and Zivin (2002) find that 
physicians tend to respond to the financial incentives associated with the typical patient rather than to those 
associated with each individual patient.  Further, for patient-type-specific incentive payments to impact 
only the targeted patients, the physician must be able to identify the patients’ type.  Given that the medical 
office staff, not the physician, is usually responsible for billing, it is unlikely that the physician knows a 
patient’s type before he treats the patient.  Knowing that these patient-type-specific incentive payments 
may have a limited targeted impact in this case, they are likely to be less widely utilized by medical groups. 
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patient is imputed to limit the amount of measurement error in the dependent variable and 
to reduce the incidence of artificial associations.  I further limit my sample to the 2,687 
physicians working in group practices as my assumption regarding the exogeneity of 
hours worked will not be valid for solo practitioners.  Finally, I drop any observations 
with missing values, resulting in a final sample of 1,930 physicians and 37,404 patients. 
4.1  Physician Effort Measures 
The NAMCS collects information on three measures of per-patient physician 
effort that I use in the analysis.   The first measure of effort is the number of minutes that 
the physician spent with the patient which, after aggregation, results in a variable for the 
sample average number of minutes spent with each patient.  Due to heaping that occurs 
when the physician records how much time he spent with the patient, there are spikes in 
the distribution of this aggregated variable at regular intervals.  On average, physicians in 
the sample spend just under 22 minutes with each patient. 
The two remaining measures of per-patient physician effort are indicators of 
treatment intensity.  The first is the count of diagnostic and screening services provided, 
which captures the number of examinations performed as well as any imaging, blood 
tests, scope procedures, or other tests ordered or provided for the patient.  The second 
measure of treatment intensity is the number of procedures performed on the patient.  
Aggregating these measures up to the physician level results in variables for the sample 
average number of diagnostic and screening services provided and the sample average 
number of procedures performed.  As with the aggregated time variable, the distributions 
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of these variables exhibit heaping at regular intervals.  On average, physicians provide 
3.6 diagnostic and screening services and perform 0.2 procedures for each patient. 
4.2  Incentive Pay Measures 
The 2006, 2007, and 2008 waves of the NAMCS asked each physician if any of 
four types of performance-based incentive pay were taken into account in the physician’s 
base pay, bonuses, or withholds.  First, productivity incentive pay rewards physicians 
based on productivity measures, such as the number of cases seen each day.  The second 
type of incentive pay that physicians are asked about is a reward based on quality of care, 
where quality of care could include, for example, the number of preventive services 
performed.  The third type of incentive pay rewards physicians based patient satisfaction 
as indicated in patient surveys.  Fourth, practice profiling incentive pay rewards 
physicians based on the patterns of services, such as lab tests, procedures, and referrals, 
provided.   
 Quality of care  and patient satisfaction incentive pay are both patient-centered in 
that they reward physicians based, to some extent, on patient outcomes.  The QOC 
measure rewards physicians for providing preventive care, which reduces the patient’s 
risk of experiencing an adverse health shock.  The patient satisfaction measure rewards 
physicians for providing patients with the services they value.  If patients value 
preventive care and the associated reduction in risk, patient satisfaction incentive pay will 
reward physicians for those aspects of medical care that are also rewarded by QOC 
incentive pay.  Recognizing this, medical groups are likely to utilize both patient 
satisfaction and QOC measures, possibly in a single incentive pay instrument.  Indeed, I 
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find that of the 338 physicians in the sample who receive patient satisfaction incentive 
pay, only forty-three (13%) do not also face QOC incentive pay.  Further, of the 394 
physicians in the sample who face QOC incentive pay, only ninety-nine (25%) do not 
also face patient satisfaction incentive pay.  Due to this low incidence, a multivariate 
analysis cannot precisely distinguish the individual effects of both types of incentive pay 
simultaneously.  To account for this, I combine these incentive pay variables into a single 
binary indicator variable for either type of patient-centered incentive pay.12 
4.3  Exogenous Explanatory Variables 
The NAMCS data contain a rich set of variables that I employ as controls in the 
analysis.  I use information on the patient’s age, race, ethnicity, gender, and primary 
method of payment to control for patient characteristics.  I use data on the patient’s 
reason for the office visit and whether the patient has been previously seen in the medical 
practice to control for characteristics related to the patient’s health.  To control for 
physician characteristics, I include data on whether the physician is the patient’s primary 
care provider, whether the physician is a medical or osteopathic doctor, whether the 
physician is an owner in the group, whether the physician is accepting new patients, 
whether the physician sees patients on evenings or weekends, and information of the 
physician’s specialty.  I also use information on whether the medical practice performs its 
own lab testing, whether the practice uses electronic medical records, and the type of 
medical practice to control for medical group characteristics.  I use data on geographic 
                                                          
12 Sensitivity analyses show that the results are not sensitive to this restriction. 
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region and whether or not the practice is located in an MSA to control for regional 
effects.  Table A1 of the Appendix presents sample statistics for these variables. 
 4.4  Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 shows the average per-patient physician effort outcomes grouped by the 
incentive pay variables.  Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest that physicians who 
face incentive pay exert different levels of effort than other physicians and that the type 
of incentive pay matters.  Physicians who receive productivity incentive pay spend less 
time, on average, with their patients, supporting the idea that productivity incentive pay 
may be used to correct for moral hazard.  Physicians who face patient-centered or 
practice profiling incentive pay provide significantly more diagnostic and screening 
services, on average, which is consistent with the use of incentive pay to induce demand. 
Physicians who face patient-centered incentive pay perform fewer procedures, on 
average.  This is contrary to induced demand, although one may expect these results if 
this type of incentive pay is targeted towards a group of physicians, such as primary care 
physicians, who typically perform fewer procedures than their colleagues in other 
specialties.  Indeed, I find that primary care physicians are more likely to not perform 
procedures during the reporting period and are more likely to receive patient-centered 
incentive pay than physicians who practice in medical or surgical specialties. 
It is important to keep in mind that there are likely observable and unobservable 
characteristics confounding these results.  More advanced multivariate techniques must 
be employed before a definitive statement can be made about the causal effects of 
incentive pay on per-patient physician effort. 
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5.  Econometric Methods 
 In this study, I employ multivariate techniques to estimate the relationship 
between the incentive pay faced by physicians and three quantitative measures of average 
per-patient physician effort: (1) the number of minutes spent with each patient; (2) the 
number of diagnostic and screening services provided to each patient; and (3) the number 
of procedures performed on each patient.   
   For the baseline model, I estimate the following equation using Ordinary Least  
 
Squares (OLS) for the non-left-censored outcome (minutes spent with each patient) and a  
 
Tobit model for the left-censored outcomes (number of diagnostic and screening services  
 
and number of procedures): 
 
 
y0 = β0 + β1ProdIncPay + β2PatIncPay + β3ProfIncPay + β4X + ε0  (1) 
 
 
where y0 is a quantitative measure of average per-patient physician effort, ProdIncPay is 
a binary variable for productivity incentive pay, PatIncPay is a binary variable for 
patient-centered incentive pay, ProfIncPay is a binary variable for practice profiling 
incentive pay, and X is the full set of control variables discussed above, expressed as a 
single vector for simplicity.  A Tobit model is necessary when the outcome is the number 
of diagnostic and screening services or the number of procedures because during the 
reporting period, thirty-six physicians (2%) do not provide any diagnostic and screening 
services and 770 physicians (40%) do not perform any procedures. 
 While the baseline model controls for the effect of observed confounders on per- 
 
patient physician effort, it fails to account for the effect of unobserved confounders.   
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Suppose that the error term in equation (1) is generated as  
 
 
ε0 = ρ0v + u0  (2) 
 
 
where u0 is normally distributed, v is an unobserved factor, and ρ0 is a factor loading 
term.  If the unobservable physician characteristic, v, influences both the physician’s 
selection into a medical group with incentive pay and the effort exerted by the physician, 
the OLS and Tobit estimators will be biased.  I control for this selection bias by modeling 
the relevant unobserved heterogeneity through discrete factor approximation which will 
represent this unobservable physician characteristic with a discrete distribution.13 
 Mroz (1999) presents the discrete factor approximation framework for the case of  
 
a single dummy endogenous variable.  Following his framework, suppose that whether or  
 
not the physician chooses each of the three types of incentive pay is determined by an  
 
underlying latent variable according to 
 
 
 y1* = α10 + α11X + ρ1v + u1  (3) 
 
 



 ≥
=
.0
0*1 1
otherwise
yif
ProdIncPay  
 
 
y2* = α20 + α21X + ρ2v + u2  (4) 
 
                                                          
13 Since the NAMCS data are collected as a repeated cross section of physicians, a fixed effects estimator 
as used by Melichar (2009) cannot be employed here. 
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


 ≥
=
.0
0*1 2
otherwise
yif
PatIncPay
 
 
 
y3* = α30 + α31X + ρ3v + u3   (5) 
 
 



 ≥
=
.0
0*1 3
otherwise
yif
ProfIncPay  
 
As in equation (2), u1, u2, and u3 are normally distributed; v is an unobserved factor 
approximated by a discrete distribution with two points of support; and ρ1, ρ2, and ρ3 are 
factor loading coefficients. 14 Only the outcomes y0, ProdIncPay, PatIncPay, and 
ProfIncPay and the controls in X are observed.  The parameters β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, α10, α11, 
α20, α21, α30, α31, and ρ0 from equations (1) – (5), along with one point of support and 
weight from the discrete distribution of v, are estimated simultaneously.15 
 As mentioned previously, the dependent variables exhibit heaping at regular 
intervals.  To correct for this in the discrete factor approximation models, I discretize the 
dependent variables into ordered variables with equal-sized bins according to the heaping 
                                                          
14 I tested the models with additional points of support.  The models converge with three points of support 
when ρ2 and ρ3 are both fixed at one; however, the models fail to converge with three points of support 
when when ρ2 and ρ3 are estimated freely or when the sample is divided to test for heterogeneity.  In the 
models with three points of support and ρ2 and ρ3 both fixed at one, the probability on the third point of 
support is less than 0.04 in each model, suggesting that the third point of support carries little weight.  
Further, the conclusions do not change when the third point of support is included.  Therefore, for 
consistency, I present results of all models estimated with two points of support. 
15 I estimate these equations jointly using the aML software (Lillard and Panis, 2003). 
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and estimate equation (1) as an ordered probit model with known thresholds.16, 17  With a 
large number of thresholds, this approach approximates the estimates from a continuous 
model; and constructing the dependent variables as ordered variables with equal-sized 
bins according to the spikes in the distributions corrects for the non-normality of these 
variables. 
 The principle advantage of the discrete factor approximation approach is that it 
allows for a flexible specification of the unobserved heterogeneity.  As Heckman and 
Singer (1984) show, if one were to choose a specific distribution for the unobserved 
factor, such as a normally distributed random effect, the parameter estimates of the model 
would be sensitive to that choice.  Discrete factor approximation allows one to avoid such 
sensitivity of the parameter estimates.  However, this approach is not without its 
limitations.  Primarily, discrete factor approximation assumes that there is a single, time-
invariant, unobserved variable that is the source of the omitted variable bias.  In this case, 
that single unobservable could be characterized as a measure of physician work habits. 
 A further limitation of the model is that identification of the full set of parameters 
relies on the nonlinear specification of the model, on the restriction of ρ1 = 1 in the 
variance-covariance matrix, and on the independence of v and X.  While this 
identification is achieved in theory, the model may not be identified in practice.  Indeed, 
this is the case for the censored outcomes.  Thus, I present results from the model with ρ2 
                                                          
16 In discretizing the left-censored outcomes, I create a unique bin for the zero values to maintain the Tobit 
structure. 
17 Estimating equation (1) as an ordered probit with known thresholds also allows me to circumnavigate an 
apparent bug in aML when estimating multi-equation models with both discrete and continuous outcomes. 
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and ρ3 both fixed at one.  This restriction allows identification of the model at the expense 
of restricting the unobserved variable to have the same correlation with each type of 
incentive pay. 
6.  Results 
 6.1  OLS and Tobit Models 
 Table 2 presents the estimates of equation (1) without controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  As column (1) shows, productivity incentive pay has a strong impact on 
the time spent with patients.  Physicians who face productivity incentive pay spend, on 
average, a statistically significant one minute and 44 seconds less with each patient than 
physicians who do not face this type of incentive pay.  The estimates also suggest that 
patient-centered and practice profiling incentive pay are each associated with 
approximately one more minute spent with each patient, although these two estimates are 
not statistically significant. 
Columns (2) and (3) present evidence that incentive pay also impacts treatment 
intensity.  Physicians who receive practice profiling incentive pay order an average of 
0.26 more diagnostic and screening services and perform 0.04 more procedures.  These 
results suggest that physicians who face practice profiling incentive pay provide seven 
percent more diagnostic and screening services and perform twenty-two percent more 
procedures than average.  On the other hand, patient-centered incentive pay appears to 
have a negative impact on the number of procedures performed, reducing the number of 
procedures by a statistically significant sixteen percent over the mean. 
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6.2  Discrete Factor Approximation Models 
 While the results discussed above do not control for possible selection bias from 
unobservable characteristics, Table 3 presents results from the discrete factor 
approximation models with ρ2 and ρ3 both fixed at one.18  These results provide evidence 
of unobserved heterogeneity bias in the OLS model for time spent with patients but 
generally confirm the results from the two Tobit models for treatment intensity. 
Column (1) presents the results from the discrete factor approximation model for 
the average time spent with patients.  This model confirms the result from the OLS model 
that productivity incentive pay is associated with a reduction in the average number of 
minutes a physician spends with each patient, although with a slightly larger impact of 
approximately two minutes.  This finding suggests that productivity incentive pay may be 
successful in inducing physicians to work harder to see more patients, increasing their 
overall level of effort.  Indeed, if a physician reduces his time spent with each patient 
from the average of 21 minutes and 47 seconds to 19 minutes and 43 seconds, in an eight 
hour workday he will see two additional patients.  If, however, time spent with the patient 
is a proxy for quality, productivity incentive pay that increases overall physician effort by 
decreasing per-patient effort comes at the expense of the quality of medical care received 
by the patient.   
One the other hand, this model does not confirm the effects of patient-centered 
and practice profiling incentive pay on the average time spent with patients found in the 
OLS model.  Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, I find that patient-centered 
                                                          
18 I discuss results from a discrete factor approximation model without this restriction later in this paper. 
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incentive pay is associated with physicians spending, on average, just over a minutes less 
with each patient, although this coefficient estimate is imprecisely measured.  Further, the 
results suggest that practice profiling incentive pay has a small, negative, and 
insignificant impact on the time spent with each patient. 
 The estimate of the factor loading term in the main equation of this model, ρ0, is 
moderately sized at 1.19 although not statistically significant.  This may suggest the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity leading to bias in the OLS results.  Comparing the 
OLS results with those from the discrete factor approximation model, it appears that the 
unobserved heterogeneity leads to positive selection bias in the coefficient estimates for 
patient-centered and practice profiling incentive pay, with less evidence of bias in the 
coefficient estimate for productivity incentive pay. 
 Column (3) of Table 3 presents the results from a discrete factor approximation 
model for the average number of diagnostic and screening services provided.  Consistent 
with those found in the Tobit model without controls for unobserved heterogeneity, the 
results found here suggest that productivity and patient-centered incentive pay reduce the 
average number of diagnostic and screening services provided to each patient; however, 
the size of the effect is much larger although imprecisely estimated.19  These results also 
suggest that practice profiling incentive pay increases the average number of diagnostic 
and screening services provided, again consistent with the results from the Tobit model; 
however, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate is smaller here and imprecisely 
                                                          
19 The standard errors are also larger in this model, causing the coefficient estimates to remain statistically 
insignificant. 
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estimated.  Finally, looking to the estimate of the factor loading term in the main 
equation, the estimate of the correlation is small and not significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that while there may be some unobserved heterogeneity in this model, its 
overall effect should be small. 
 Finally, the results in column (4) show the effect of incentive pay on the average 
number of procedures performed on each patient.  These results suggest that productivity 
incentive pay has essentially no impact on the average number of procedures performed.  
On the other hand, the results indicate that patient-centered incentive pay has a small 
negative effect on the average number of procedures performed while practice profiling 
incentive pay has a small positive effect.  These effects are smaller in magnitude than, 
though consistent with, those found in the Tobit model and less precisely estimated.  
Similar to the model for diagnostic and screening services, I find little evidence of 
unobserved heterogeneity entering into this model.  The estimate of the factor loading 
term in the main equation is very close to zero and statistically insignificant. 
 As columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 show, the discrete factor approximation models 
for treatment intensity confirm the results of the OLS models.  Patient-centered incentive 
pay appears to reduce the number of procedures performed while practice profiling 
incentive pay seems to increase both the average number of diagnostic and screening 
services provided and procedures performed.  Although the coefficients are less precisely 
estimated in these models, I find little evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in these two 
models.  Thus one may interpret the OLS estimates as providing evidence of the effect of 
incentive pay on treatment intensity. 
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 These models also provide estimates of the effects of the explanatory variables on 
per-patient physician effort.  Looking first at the controls for patient characteristics, the 
results indicate that as the average age of a physician’s patients increases, the physician 
will tend to spend more time with each patient but provide fewer diagnostic and 
screening services.  Physicians with more male patients may spend less time with each 
patient and provide lower levels of treatment intensity; physicians with more black 
patients or more Hispanic patients provide more diagnostic and screening services; and 
physicians with more non-white and non-black patients spend more time with each 
patient.  As the percent of patients expected to pay with public insurance increases, 
physicians will tend to spend fewer minutes with each patient.   
The results also provide information as to how the health of a patient impacts the 
physician’s effort.  As the percentage of patients seeing the physician for an acute or 
chronic problem increases, the physician will, on average, tend decrease treatment 
intensity; however, the percentage of patients with chronic problems is positively 
associated with the amount of time spent with each patient.  As the percentage of patients 
seeing the physician for a pre- or post-surgery visit increases, the physician will spend 
less time with each patient, will perform fewer diagnostic or screening tests, and will 
order more procedures. 
As the proportion of a physician’s patients who have been seen before in the 
medical practice increases, the physician will spend, on average, less time with each 
patient and will provide a lower level of treatment intensity.  When a greater percentage 
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of patients are seen by their primary care doctors, the physicians tend to spend more time 
with each patient and provide more diagnostic and screening services. 
Observable physician characteristics also impact physician effort.  Physicians who 
are owners in the practice tend to spend about two fewer minutes with the average patient 
than physicians who are not owners.  Physicians who see patients on evenings or 
weekends tend to order fewer diagnostic and screening services.  Surgical and medical 
specialists tend to provide fewer diagnostic and screening services; however, they do tend 
to perform more procedures, on average, than primary care physicians.  Medical 
specialists tend to spend more time with their patients. 
Finally, I find some evidence that the characteristics of the medical group and the 
geographic region impact the physician’s effort.  When a physician’s medical practice 
performs its own lab testing, the physician will spend less time with the average patient 
but will provide a higher level of treatment intensity.  When the medical group uses 
electronic medical records, physicians tend to spend more time with each patient.  When 
the medical group is located in an MSA, the physician will tend to provide more 
diagnostic and screening services.  Further, physicians who practice in the western United 
States tend to spend more time with each patient and perform more procedures than those 
who practice in southern states. 
6.3  Analysis by Insurance Type 
As mentioned previously, if physicians face different incentive pay for different 
groups of patients, my assumption of a uniform response to incentive pay across all 
patients seen by a physician may not be appropriate.  This may be most relevant for 
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patients with private versus public insurance plans.  Private insurance plans often have 
very different reimbursement schedules than Medicare and Medicaid; thus a medical 
group’s revenue function could be decomposed into three independent parts: revenue 
from private insurance patients, revenue from Medicare patients, and revenue from 
Medicaid patients.  With three independent streams of revenue, a medical group may find 
it useful to offer physicians incentive pay that varies across private insurance, Medicare, 
and Medicaid patients.  To allow for this possibility, I aggregate the patient-level data up 
to the physician level in subsamples based on whether the patient is expected to pay 
primarily with private insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid and repeat the analyses from 
Table 3 for each subsample.  Aggregating the patient-level data by insurance type results 
in a subsample of 1,756 physicians who saw any private insurance patients during the 
reporting period, a subsample of 1,408 physicians who saw any Medicare patients during 
the reporting period, and a subsample of 1,037 physicians who saw any Medicaid patients 
during the reporting period.20  Summary statistics for these subsamples are presented in 
Appendix Table A1. 
The results in Table 4 show the impact of incentive pay on physician effort by 
insurance type.  Table 4 presents only the key results for brevity; however, the full set of 
estimates from the models may be found in Appendix Tables A2, A3, and A4.  Columns 
(1) through (3) of Table 4 show the impact of incentive pay on the average time spent 
with patients for each of the insurance subsamples.  The results indicate that all three 
types of incentive pay have a stronger, negative impact on the number of minutes 
                                                          
20 These subsamples are not exclusive. 
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physicians spend with Medicaid patients than on the time spent with private insurance 
and Medicare patients.  While productivity incentive pay reduces the average amount of 
time spent with each private insurance and Medicare patient by 2.1 and 2.4 minutes 
respectively, it reduces the amount of time spent with each Medicaid patient by 4.2 
minutes.  Patient-centered incentive pay reduces the average amount of time physicians 
spent with Medicaid patients by over six minutes but has a smaller and statistically 
insignificant impact on the time spent with private insurance and Medicare patients.  
Practice profiling incentive pay also has a larger negative impact on the average time 
spent with Medicaid patients than on the time spent with private insurance or Medicare 
patients; however, these coefficient estimates are not statistically significant.  The 
estimate of ρ0 is close to one and statistically insignificant in the models for private 
insurance and Medicare patients; however, in the model for Medicaid patients, ρ0 is very 
large at 5.8 and highly significant, indicating that there is a larger amount of unobserved 
heterogeneity in this model than in the models for private insurance and Medicare 
patients. 
Columns (4) through (6) of Table 4 show the impact of incentive pay on the 
average number of diagnostic and screening services provided to each patient.  These 
results suggest that productivity incentive pay and patient-centered incentive pay have 
approximately the same impact on the average number of diagnostic and screening 
services provided, regardless of insurance type.  Practice profiling incentive pay appears 
to have a larger, positive impact on the average number of diagnostic and screening 
services provided to Medicaid patients than to other patients, although this result is not 
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statistically significant.  The estimates of ρ0 are small and statistically insignificant in 
these models, suggesting that there is little unobserved heterogeneity in these models. 
Columns (7) through (9) of Table 4 show the effect of incentive pay on the 
average number of procedures performed on each patient by insurance type.  The results 
show that while productivity incentive pay has virtually no impact on the average number 
of procedures performed on private insurance and Medicare patients, it may slightly 
increase the number of procedures performed on Medicaid patients, although the 
estimates are not statistically significant.  Patient-centered incentive pay has little if any 
impact on the average number of procedures performed on private insurance and 
Medicaid patients, but appears to reduce the number of procedures performed on each 
Medicare patient by a marginally significant 0.07, a reduction of 37 percent over the 
mean.  Finally, while practice profiling incentive pay does not appear to impact the 
average number of procedures performed on Medicare patients, it does seem to increase 
the average number of procedures performed on other patients.  For each private 
insurance patient, practice profiling incentive pay may increase the number of procedures 
by a marginally significant 0.03, an increase of 18 percent over the mean; and for each 
Medicaid patient, practice profiling incentive pay may increase the number of procedures 
by an imprecisely estimated 0.05, an increase of 37 percent over the mean.  The estimates 
of ρ0 in these models are small and statistically insignificant, indicating little evidence of 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
  
35 
 
6.4  Analysis by Health Status 
One possible explanation for the results found above is that physicians respond to 
incentive pay by reducing the amount of time they spend with relatively healthy patients 
without compromising the care of less healthy patients.  If this were the case, the 
reduction in time spent with patients resulting from incentive pay may not translate into a 
reduction in the quality of medical care received.  In this section, I explore this possibility 
by aggregating the data into subsamples based on health status.  The relatively healthy 
subsample consists of patients with no chronic conditions, and there are 1,718 physicians 
who saw patients with no chronic conditions during the reporting period.  The less 
healthy subsample consists of patients with one or more chronic conditions; there are 
1,847 physicians who saw patients with one or more chronic conditions in the reporting 
period.  The key results for these subsamples are presented in Table 5; the full results 
may be found in Appendix Table A6. 
As Table 5 shows, incentive pay is associated with a larger negative impact on the 
time spent with relatively healthy patients than on the time spent with less healthy 
patients.  Productivity incentive pay appears to reduce the average amount of time spent 
with each patient for both subsamples, although, the magnitude of the result is almost a 
minute and a half larger for patients without chronic conditions.  Patient-centered 
incentive pay appears to reduce the average time spent with relatively healthy patients by 
two minutes and fifteen seconds, while the result for less healthy patients is smaller and 
statistically insignificant.  Practice profiling incentive pay also seems to have a larger 
negative impact on the time spent with patients without chronic conditions, although the 
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result is not statistically significant for either subsample.  Overall, these results suggest 
that while productivity incentive pay reduces the average amount of time physicians 
spend with both groups of patients, the effect of patient-centered incentive pay may be 
limited to relatively healthy patients who may be less likely to see a reduction in quality 
of medical care from the reduction in time. 
6.5  Sensitivity Analysis 
 As discussed above, identification of the full set of parameters in an unrestricted 
discrete factor approximation model with ρ2 and ρ3 freed up for estimation is theoretically 
possibly but may not be practically feasible in this application.  Indeed, I have found that 
the model is not fully identified when the dependent variable is censored.  Thus, until 
now, I have discussed results of discrete factor approximation models with ρ2 and ρ3 
fixed at one.  In this section, I will relax that restriction and present results from a discrete 
factor approximation model for the average time spent with each patient, using the full 
sample of patient-level data aggregated to the physician level.  These results are 
presented in Table A5 of the appendix. 
 The results here are very similar to those presented in Table 3.  I find that 
productivity incentive pay is associated with a reduction in the amount of time spent with 
each patient by one minute and 44 seconds, on average.  Patient-centered incentive pay 
may reduce the average amount of time spent with each patient by about two and a half 
minutes, although this coefficient estimate is imprecisely measured.  Practice profiling 
incentive pay has a small, negative, and statistically insignificant impact on the amount of 
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time spent with each patient.  The estimate of ρ0 in this model is large at 2.3 and 
marginally significant, indicating that unobserved heterogeneity is present in this model. 
7.  Conclusion 
 In order to understand the full impact of physicians’ incentive pay, including its 
implications for the cost and quality of medical care, one must know if and how such 
incentive pay broadly alters physician effort.  This paper provides clear evidence to that 
effect, showing that not only do physicians respond to incentive pay by changing broad 
measures of per-patient effort, they do so differently for different types of incentive pay 
and for patients with different types of insurance plans. 
 I find strong evidence that productivity incentive pay may cause physicians to 
reduce the average number of minutes spent with each patient.  This effect is 
approximately twice as large for Medicaid patients than for private insurance or Medicare 
patients and is over sixty percent larger for relatively healthy patients than for those with 
chronic conditions.  Thus productivity incentive pay appears to be a mitigating impact on 
healthcare costs, reducing the costs associated with physician time; if, however, there are 
positive benefits associated with a physician spending more time with each patient, 
productivity incentive pay will result in a decrease in the quality of healthcare. 
 I also find evidence that patient-centered incentive pay may reduce the amount of 
time spent with relatively healthy patients, the amount of time spent with Medicaid 
patients, and the number of procedures performed, especially for Medicare patients.  As 
with productivity incentive pay, these results suggest that patient-centered incentive pay 
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will help to reduce the costs of medical care, potentially at the expense of reducing the 
quality of medical care received, particularly for patients with public insurance. 
 Finally, I find that practice profiling incentive pay may lead to increases in both 
types of treatment intensity.  The effect of practice profiling incentive pay on the average 
number of diagnostic and screening services provided is strongest for Medicaid patients 
while the effect on the average number of procedures is strongest for private insurance 
and Medicaid patients.  While productivity and patient-centered incentive pay will help to 
reduce the costs of medical care, the increase in treatment intensity associated with 
practice profiling incentive pay will have the opposite effect.  Further, if this increase in 
treatment intensity is not purely an induced demand effect, it will lead to an increase in 
the quality of medical care as well. 
 It is important to note the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
in analyses such as this one.  Comparing the results from Melichar (2009) and 
Balkrishnan et al. (2002), one may conclude that unobserved heterogeneity will not bias 
the estimated impact of financial incentives on physician effort, particularly when effort 
is measured as the amount of time spent with patients.  On the contrary, I find that a 
failure to account for such unobserved heterogeneity will bias the estimated effect of 
patient-centered and practice profiling incentives on the average time spent with patients. 
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Table 1.  Average Physician Effort by Incentive Status             
  Incentives 
 
Productivity Patient-Centered Practice Profiling 
  No Yes Difference No Yes Difference No Yes Difference 
Time spent with patient (Minutes) 22.3 21.1 -1.2* 21.6 22.4 0.8 21.7 22.5 0.7 
Number of diagnostic and 
screening services 
3.57 3.59 0.02 3.50 3.83 0.33*** 3.54 3.99 0.45** 
Number of procedures 0.18 0.17 -0.01 0.18 0.14 -0.04*** 0.17 0.18 0.01 
Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  There are 1930 observations in the sample.  * indicates statistical significance at 
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.  Regression Results without Controls for Unobserved Heterogeneity: Full Sample 
  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Time Spent 
with Patient 
(Minutes) 
Number of 
Diagnostic or 
Screening 
Services 
Number of 
Procedures 
 
OLS Tobit Tobit 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Productivity incentive pay  -1.732**  -0.041 0.008 
 (0.711)    (0.085)    (0.023)    
 
 
-0.040 0.004 
Patient-centered incentive pay   1.056    -0.017  -0.053*   
 (0.920)    (0.110)    (0.030)    
 
 
-0.017 -0.028 
Practice profiling incentive pay   1.103      0.269*     0.073*   
 (1.249)    (0.150)    (0.040)    
 
 
0.259 0.039 
Average patient age   0.027      0.032***  -0.00033    
 (0.021)    (0.003)    (0.001)    
 
 
0.030 -0.0002 
Fraction of male patients   0.012    -0.233  -0.083*   
 (1.504)    (0.181)    (0.050)    
 
 
-0.224 -0.044 
Fraction of patients with imputed sex  14.331*   -0.299   0.667*** 
 (7.495)    (0.907)    (0.233)    
 
 
-0.288 0.355 
Fraction of black patients   0.547      1.258*** -0.044 
 (1.764)    (0.212)    (0.060)    
 
 
1.211 -0.023 
Fraction of non-white and non-black patients   6.565***   0.563**  -0.115 
 (2.328)    (0.280)    (0.078)    
 
 
0.542 -0.061 
Fraction of patients with imputed race   0.937    -0.165 -0.055 
 (1.374)    (0.165)    (0.045)    
 
 
-0.159 -0.029 
Fraction of hispanic patients  -2.168      0.549*** -0.037 
 (1.668)    (0.200)    (0.056)    
 
 
0.528 -0.020 
Fraction of patients with imputed ethnicity  -0.944     -0.292*   0.065 
 (1.318)    (0.159)    (0.043)    
 
 
-0.281 0.035 
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Fraction of patients expected to pay primarily 
with public insurance 
 -3.454*** -0.153 0.014 
(1.317)    (0.158)    (0.044)    
 
 
-0.148 0.008 
Fraction of patients expected to pay primarily 
with means other than private or public 
insurance 
 -3.700*   0.04 0.097 
(2.151)    (0.259)    (0.071)    
 
 
0.038 0.052 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for 
visit being an acute problem 
 -1.777     -0.669***   0.303*** 
(1.867)    (0.224)    (0.062)    
  
-0.644 0.161 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for 
visit being a chronic problem 
  3.444**   -0.894*** -0.006 
(1.705)    (0.205)    (0.058)    
 
 
-0.861 -0.003 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for 
visit being a pre-/post-surgery visit 
  1.003    -0.425   0.477*** 
(2.714)    (0.326)    (0.087)    
 
 
-0.409 0.254 
Fraction of patients seen before in the medical 
practice 
-12.566***  -0.489**  -0.06 
(1.925)    (0.232)    (0.064)    
 
 
-0.470 -0.032 
Fraction of patients with imputed values for 
having been seen before in the practice 
 -0.827    -0.293  -0.391**  
(5.284)    (0.634)    (0.199)    
 
 
-0.281 -0.208 
Fraction of patients for whom the physician is 
the primary care doctor 
  2.737**  0.154 -0.006 
(1.272)    (0.153)    (0.042)    
  
0.149 -0.003 
Physician is an MD   0.842    -0.209  -0.082**  
 
(1.286)    (0.154)    (0.041)    
 
 
-0.201 -0.043 
Physician is an owner in the practice  -2.082*** 0.065 0.031 
 (0.734)    (0.088)    (0.024)    
 
 
0.062 0.017 
Physician sees patients on evenings or 
weekends   0.752    -0.145 0.009 
 (0.775)    (0.093)    (0.025)    
 
 
-0.140 0.005 
Physician is accepting new patients  -0.294    0.224 -0.065 
 (1.655)    (0.199)    (0.054)    
 
 
0.215 -0.034 
Physician specialty is surgical care   0.790     -2.236***   0.238*** 
 (1.505)    (0.181)    (0.049)    
 
 
-2.152 0.127 
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Physician specialty is medical care   5.141***  -1.014***   0.102**  
 (1.354)    (0.163)    (0.045)    
 
 
-0.976 0.054 
Medical practice performs its own lab testing  -0.799      0.626***   0.052**  
 (0.709)    (0.085)    (0.023)    
 
 
0.602 0.028 
Medical practice has electronic medical 
records  -0.186    0.117 0.001 
 (0.646)    (0.078)    (0.021)    
 
 
0.113 0.001 
The medical practice is a private practice  -0.812      0.188*   0.024 
 (0.918)    (0.110)    (0.030)    
 
 
0.181 0.013 
Medical practice is located in an MSA  -1.127      0.375*** -0.038 
 (1.058)    (0.127)    (0.034)    
 
 
0.361 -0.020 
Medical practice is located in the northeast   1.120    0.08 -0.014 
 (0.919)    (0.110)    (0.030)    
 
 
0.077 -0.007 
Medical practice is located in the midwest  -0.519    0.011 0.025 
 (0.840)    (0.101)    (0.027)    
 
 
0.010 0.013 
Medical practice is located in the west   1.660*   -0.088   0.092*** 
 (0.946)    (0.114)    (0.031)    
 
 
-0.085 0.049 
Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  There are 1,930 observations.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses.  Marginal effects on the censored means are in italics  * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 3.  Restricted Discrete Factor Approximation Model Results: Full Sample 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Time Spent 
with Patient 
(Minutes) 
Number of 
Diagnostic or 
Screening 
Services 
Number of 
Procedures 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Productivity incentive pay -2.045 **  -0.126      0.0003 
 (0.958)    (0.156)    (0.039) 
 
 
-0.116 0.0001 
Patient-centered incentive pay -1.156     -0.152     -0.062     
 (1.379)    (0.238)    (0.056) 
 
 
-0.139 -0.018 
Practice profiling incentive pay -0.019      0.144      0.057     
 (1.098)    (0.181)    (0.048) 
 
 
0.133 0.016 
Average patient age  0.023 *    0.030 *** -0.0004 
 (0.014)    (0.003)    (0.001) 
 
 
0.027 -0.0001 
Fraction of male patients -1.125     -0.286 *   -0.079 *   
 (0.828)    (0.155)    (0.044) 
 
 
-0.263 -0.023 
Fraction of patients with imputed sex  0.166     -0.091      0.536 **  
 (5.242)    (1.031)    (0.237) 
 
 
-0.084 0.153 
Fraction of black patients -0.161      1.095 *** -0.036     
 (1.085)    (0.201)    (0.059) 
 
 
1.007 -0.010 
Fraction of non-white and non-black patients 
 
 4.038 ***  0.515     -0.093     
(1.332)    (0.353)    (0.086) 
 
 
0.474 -0.027 
Fraction of patients with imputed race  0.241     -0.159     -0.055     
 (0.916)    (0.161)    (0.045) 
 
 
-0.147 -0.016 
Fraction of hispanic patients -1.882      0.399 **  -0.036     
 (1.282)    (0.199)    (0.055) 
 
 
0.367 -0.010 
Fraction of patients with imputed ethnicity -1.896 **  -0.242      0.066     
 (0.858)    (0.158)    (0.043) 
 
 
-0.223 0.019 
Fraction of patients expected to pay primarily -1.632 **  -0.139     -0.002     
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with public insurance (0.805)    (0.155)    (0.041) 
 
 
-0.128 -0.001 
Fraction of patients expected to pay primarily 
with means other than private or public 
insurance 
 
-1.152      0.019      0.080     
(1.501)    (0.248)    (0.071) 
 
0.017 0.023 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for 
visit being an acute problem 
-1.617     -0.668 ***  0.286 *** 
(1.080)    (0.218)    (0.061) 
  
-0.615 0.082 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for 
visit being a chronic problem 
 2.229 **  -0.918 ***  0.002     
(1.051)    (0.192)    (0.057) 
 
 
-0.845 0.001 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for 
visit being a pre-/post-surgery visit 
-1.931     -0.461      0.399 *** 
(1.514)    (0.300)    (0.073) 
 
 
-0.424 0.114 
Fraction of patients seen before in the medical 
practice 
-9.642 *** -0.461 **  -0.051     
(1.081)    (0.204)    (0.048) 
 
 
-0.424 -0.015 
Fraction of patients with imputed values for 
having been seen before in the practice 
 2.032     -0.184     -0.318     
(3.741)    (0.626)    (0.264) 
 
 
-0.169 -0.091 
Fraction of patients for whom the physician is 
the primary care doctor 
 1.008      0.133     -0.007     
(0.762)    (0.147)    (0.040) 
  
0.123 -0.002 
Physician is an MD  0.248     -0.224     -0.080 *   
 
(0.988)    (0.188)    (0.046) 
 
 
-0.206 -0.023 
Physician is an owner in the practice -2.189 ***  0.036      0.028     
 (0.508)    (0.087)    (0.024) 
 
 
0.033 0.008 
Physician sees patients on evenings or 
weekends 
 0.339     -0.172 *    0.010     
(0.546)    (0.099)    (0.025) 
 
 
-0.158 0.003 
Physician is accepting new patients -1.037      0.220     -0.042     
 (1.199)    (0.202)    (0.046) 
 
 
0.202 -0.012 
Physician specialty is surgical care -0.051     -2.227 ***  0.236 *** 
 (0.941)    (0.160)    (0.044) 
 
 
-2.048 0.067 
Physician specialty is medical care  4.332 *** -1.071 ***  0.087 **  
 (0.850)    (0.144)    (0.040) 
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-0.985 0.025 
Medical practice performs its own lab testing -0.804      0.647 ***  0.047 **  
(0.505)    (0.082)    (0.023) 
 
 
0.595 0.014 
Medical practice has electronic medical 
records 
 0.867 *    0.114      0.001     
(0.455)    (0.077)    (0.020) 
 
 
0.105 0.000 
The medical practice is a private practice  0.045      0.152      0.014     
 (0.593)    (0.108)    (0.029) 
 
 
0.140 0.004 
Medical practice is located in an MSA -1.086      0.387 *** -0.028     
 (0.698)    (0.128)    (0.032) 
 
 
0.356 -0.008 
Medical practice is located in the northeast  0.928     -0.012     -0.008     
(0.639)    (0.109)    (0.028) 
 
 
-0.011 -0.002 
Medical practice is located in the midwest -0.516      0.004      0.031     
 (0.581)    (0.098)    (0.026) 
 
 
0.004 0.009 
Medical practice is located in the west  1.493 **  -0.079      0.080 *** 
 (0.645)    (0.108)    (0.028) 
 
 
-0.073 0.023 
ρ0  1.188       0.102       0.015     
 
(0.961)     (0.163)     (0.038) 
Point 1 -1.245     -1.244 -1.242 
Point 2  1.092 ***   1.102 ***   1.101 *** 
 
(0.086)    -0.087 -0.087 
Weight  0.569 ***   0.564 ***   0.567 *** 
 
(0.061)     (0.061)     (0.061) 
Log Likelihood -6211.43 -7090.60 -6171.98 
Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  There are 1,930 observations.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses.  Marginal effects on the censored means are in italics  * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.  Restricted Discrete Factor Approximation Model Results by Type of Insurance 
 
Time Spent with Patient (Minutes) Diagnostic and Screening Services Procedures 
 
Private 
Insurance Medicare Medicaid 
Private 
Insurance Medicare Medicaid 
Private 
Insurance Medicare Medicaid 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Productivity 
incentive pay 
-2.071 **  -2.420 **  -4.218 *** -0.179     -0.153     -0.148     -0.015     -0.013      0.175     
(0.982)    (1.044)    (0.935)    (0.164)    (0.192)    (0.243)    (0.055)    (0.084)    (0.127) 
   
-0.164 -0.137 -0.135 -0.004 -0.003 0.040 
Patient-centered 
incentive pay 
-0.539     -0.698     -6.101 *** -0.137     -0.161     -0.214     -0.044     -0.293 *    0.001     
(1.398)    (1.638)    (1.023)    (0.245)    (0.342)    (0.337)    (0.081)    (0.150)    (0.204) 
   
-0.125 -0.144 -0.194 -0.013 -0.072 0.000 
Practice profiling 
incentive pay 
-0.234     -0.571     -1.719     -0.018     -0.046      0.208      0.113 *    0.019      0.236     
(1.167)    (1.386)    (1.097)    (0.206)    (0.263)    (0.269)    (0.066)    (0.113)    (0.187) 
   
-0.017 -0.041 0.189 0.033 0.005 0.054 
ρ0  0.990   1.149   5.795 ***  0.172   0.150   0.098   0.017   0.124  -0.181  
 
(0.966) (1.103) (0.653)    (0.164) (0.223) (0.234) (0.054) (0.092) (0.137) 
Log Likelihood -5641.64 -4518.29 -3343.97 -6460.93 -5198.86 -3825.88 -5257.96 -3876.61 -2596.82 
Observations 1756 1408 1037 1756 1408 1037 1756 1408 1037 
Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Marginal effects on the censored means are in 
italics.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.  Restricted Discrete Factor Approximation Model Results by Health Status 
 
Time Spent with Patient 
 
No Chronic 
Conditions 
One or More 
Chronic Conditions 
  (1) (2) 
Productivity incentive pay -3.559 *** -2.147 **  
 (0.890)    (0.993)    
Patient-centered incentive pay -2.249 **  -1.248     
 (1.011)    (1.312)    
Practice profiling incentive pay -1.317     -0.416     
 (1.022)    (1.169)    
Log Likelihood -5477.27 -5910.12 
Observations 1718 1847 
Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * 
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% 
level. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
EXITING TANF IN SOUTH CAROLINA AFTER THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) made a number of changes to the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program with the goal of increasing 
the economic self-sufficiency of welfare recipients.  As part of these changes, the DRA 
standardized across states the work and work readiness activities that satisfy the TANF 
work requirement.  Being that states could previously define their own work activities, 
this policy change had a unique impact on the TANF program in each state.  For South 
Carolina in particular, it meant narrowing the set of activities that may be used to satisfy 
the TANF work requirement. 
This essay uses administrative records from South Carolina to examine the impact 
of the DRA’s change in allowable work activities on the likelihood of welfare recipients 
to exit the state’s TANF program.  To accomplish this task, I employ descriptive and 
multivariate event-history techniques with a difference-in-difference estimation 
framework to identify the impact of the DRA on the overall likelihood of exit from the 
TANF program in South Carolina, on the likelihood of exit through three different paths, 
and on the duration of benefit receipt.  I find that in narrowing the list of allowable work 
and work readiness activities, the DRA had a very different impact on black recipients in 
South Carolina than on non-blacks, leading overall to longer durations of TANF 
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participation for blacks but shorter durations for non-blacks.  The DRA also had a 
differential impact on exits due to employment for black and non-black recipients. 
Over the past two decades, welfare reform has sought to strengthen work 
incentives, and a breadth of literature has looked at the effects of these incentives on 
welfare recipients (see, e.g.,  Blank (2002), Moffitt (2003), and Grogger and Karoly 
(2005) for reviews).  This project adds to the literature in three ways.  First, it is one of 
very few studies on the impact of welfare reform since 2000, let alone on the DRA.  As 
Ribar and Wolff (2013) show, the TANF caseload declined by almost 50 percent between 
2000 and 2008, and the economic circumstances of those who leave TANF worsened.  
The impact of welfare reform must be considered in light of these changes.  By focusing 
this study around the DRA legislation of 2005, this project accomplishes that task. 
The second way in which this analysis contributes to the literature is by 
improving upon the methodology of prior studies.  While many studies have examined 
the impact of work requirements on welfare dependency, the success of such research has 
been hampered by the fact that a multitude of reforms were implemented all at around the 
same time and many with opposing effects.  In this study, I make use of South Carolina’s 
administrative dataset to isolate the impact of one particular reform: the DRA’s 
standardization of work and work readiness activities.  In addition to being able to isolate 
this single reform, I am also able to identify treatment and control groups of welfare 
recipients, allowing estimation of the impact of the reform under a difference-in-
difference framework. 
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Finally, little research has been done on the impact of work requirements on the 
paths through which recipients exit the TANF program.  The third contribution of this 
paper is a competing risks analysis of the impact of the DRA reform on the paths to exit 
from South Carolina’s TANF program.  In particular, I examine three exit paths: through 
employment, through increases in other income, and through administrative reasons. 
2.  TANF and the DRA 
The welfare reauthorization component of the DRA was enacted largely in 
response to policy makers’ dissatisfaction with two components of the TANF program’s 
work requirement: the work participation standard and the activities that were considered 
“work.”  First, the TANF program’s work participation standard states that fifty percent 
of all recipient households must participate in work activities, and should a state fail to 
meet its work participation standard, the state risks losing its federal TANF funding.  In 
an effort to encourage states to move recipients off of welfare and into work, each state is 
given a credit towards the work participation standard for declines in its welfare caseload.  
This way, those who leave TANF are counted as workers for the purpose of meeting the 
work participation requirement.  During the first seven years of the TANF program, the 
caseload was declining at such a rate that the work participation standard was not binding 
for many states after the credits for caseload reduction were factored in.  Policymakers 
became dissatisfied with the ineffectuality of the work participation standard.  Second, a 
2005 GAO report identified a leniency and lack of consistency across states in the types 
of activities that could count toward meeting the federal work requirement.  For example, 
some states allowed activities such as bed rest, exercise, and helping a friend with errands 
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to count as work regardless of whether or not such activities contribute to self-sufficiency 
(GAO, 2005).  Policymakers wished to have more control over these activities in the 
hopes of gearing them towards activities that are more successful at promoting self-
sufficiency. 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 attempted to remedy these issues.  When the  
DRA came into effect on October 1, 2006, it strengthened the TANF work rules through 
three main channels: (1) by defining the activities that satisfy the work requirement; (2) 
by adjusting the work participation standard based on declines in a state’s caseload from 
its 2005 level rather than from its 1995 level; and (3) by requiring that families in 
separate State programs meet the work requirements (Federal Register, 2006).  This 
project examines the impact of the first change, the definition of work activities, in the 
context of South Carolina’s TANF program.  Because South Carolina had previously set 
its own definition of work activities, the definition set by the DRA effectively changed 
the set of activities that satisfy the work requirement for welfare recipients in South 
Carolina. 
2.1. The Family Independence Program 
The TANF program in South Carolina is known as the Family Independence (FI) 
program (SC DSS, 2009).  The primary goal of the FI program is to assist families in 
becoming self-sufficient.  The program consists of three main elements geared towards 
achieving this goal: (1) work requirements; (2) FI cash benefits; and (3) support services. 
The first element, the FI work requirement, is designed to promote self-
sufficiency through full-time employment.  All FI recipients who are work-eligible, 
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meaning they are deemed able to work by the federal government, must agree to a Family 
Plan and an Employability Plan detailing the actions the recipient will take to become 
gainfully employed.  If a recipient fails to cooperate in developing a Family Plan, she 
risks losing her TANF benefits in South Carolina.  The ultimate goal of the work 
requirement is for the recipient to find a job within 24 months that offers a wage rate 
above the minimum wage, health benefits, potential for advancement, and convenience of 
location. 
While all work-eligible recipients must enter into a Family Plan and an 
Employability Plan, some of these recipients are exempt from mandatory participation in 
the work requirement.  The majority of women who are exempt are single parents with a 
child under one year of age.  A recipient may also be exempt if she is providing care for a 
disabled child who attends school, if she is a victim of domestic violence, or if she lacks 
childcare or transportation. 
The second element of the FI program is the cash benefit.  This is the money paid 
to recipients in the FI program.  Support services, the third element of the FI program, are 
non-monetary forms of assistance, such as childcare and transportation, which are 
provided to remove some barriers to employment and self-sufficiency. 
2.2 The DRA in South Carolina 
Because each state had implemented its own TANF program uniquely tailored to 
fit its needs, the DRA was likely to impact each state differently.  For TANF recipients in 
South Carolina, the impact was felt almost exclusively in the change in allowable work 
activities (those activities that would satisfy the work requirement).  Prior to the DRA, 
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South Carolina’s TANF case managers were given the authority to assign recipients to 
the work activities that they felt were most appropriate for the recipient.  After the DRA, 
much of that authority was removed.  Case managers could now only assign activities 
that the federal government had defined as work or work readiness and were required to 
provide documentation verifying that the requirement had been met.  These new rules 
caused case managers to change how they assigned work activities.  For example, South 
Carolina could no longer count time spent preparing for and traveling to a job interview 
as a work-related activity, and the time spent in the job interview needed to be verified.  
The difficulty of verification combined with the small amount of countable time led case 
managers to decrease the frequency with which they assigned recipients to job search, 
instead assigning recipients to other activities that may not lead as quickly to gainful 
employment. 
While the DRA’s definition of allowable work activities caused South Carolina to 
make changes to its TANF program, adjusting the work participation standard did not.  
Between fiscal years 2005 and 2006, South Carolina’s TANF caseload declined by 
approximately two percent, reducing South Carolina’s work participation standard from 
50 percent to 48 percent.  South Carolina received an additional credit for spending in 
excess of the required amount on the TANF program in fiscal year 2006, further reducing 
the work participation standard to 29 percent (US DHHS, 2012).  This standard requires 
that 29 percent of all families in South Carolina’s TANF program participate in work 
activities in order for South Carolina to receive federal TANF funding.  Yet from 2002 
through 2009, the percentage of TANF recipients engaged in work activities was near or 
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above 50 percent, indicating South Carolina should have had little difficulty meeting its 
work participation standard and thus should have not been constrained by the second 
change made by the DRA (U.S. DHHS, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2009a, 2011d, 
2011e).1  Further, South Carolina was able to bypass the third change made by the DRA 
by paying benefits to families in separate state programs with non-TANF related funds.  
Thus, the DRA had its primary impact on the TANF program in South Carolina through 
the change in the allowable work activities. 
3.  Welfare Reform Literature 
An abundance of literature has attempted to measure the impacts of welfare 
reforms, including those specifically related to work requirements (see Blank (2002), 
Moffitt (2003), and Grogger and Karoly (2005) for reviews).  A drawback of many of 
these studies, however, is the difficulty involved in trying to isolate the impact of any 
single reform.  When states enacted reforms, they generally changed multiple aspects of 
their welfare programs simultaneously, making identification of the effect of any single 
reform difficult.  Further, these studies tend to be sensitive to the time period under 
analysis, resulting in often conflicting and counterintuitive findings (Blank, 2002; 
Moffitt, 1999). 
There have been some studies that have successfully examined the impact of work 
requirements on welfare use and the employment of welfare recipients.  Moffitt (1996) 
finds that work requirements increased the rate of exit from the welfare program.  Blank 
                                                          
1 The work participation standard for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 are not yet available; however, the TANF 
caseload in South Carolina was declining over this period, suggesting that the work participation standard 
was at its peak in 2007 (U.S. DHHS, 2009b, 2010c). 
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(2002) finds, in her review of the literature, that mandatory work programs significantly 
increased employment and decreased welfare use.  Further, Grogger and Karoly (2005) 
find that work-related programs increased in the employment rate of welfare recipients by 
5.6 percentage points.  On the other hand, Fang and Keane (2004) highlight the 
difference between leaving welfare and working.  They find that work requirements 
accounted for 57 percent of the decrease in welfare participation from 1993 through 2002 
but only 17 percent of the increase in work participation.  These results suggest that work 
requirements were more successful at getting women to exit welfare but perhaps less 
successful at inducing work.  Indeed, close to one quarter of welfare leavers during this 
time period were not employed (Fang and Keane, 2004). 
Given the finding by Frogner, Moffitt, and Ribar (2009) that “work pays”, one 
might think that if work requirements can increase employment, they will lead to 
increased self-sufficiency of welfare recipients.  Unfortunately, this has not always been 
found to be the case.  As Blank (2002) points out in her review, the increases in income 
resulting from work requirements tend to be completely offset by the loss in welfare 
benefits.  Further, in a review of a number of early studies examining the impact of work 
requirements on the earned income of welfare recipients, Moffitt (1992) finds that the 
increases in earnings were not large enough to greatly impact self-sufficiency. 
When it comes to increasing earnings, however, studies have found that not all 
work requirements are created equal.  Programs that focused on job search or labor 
market attachment saw increases in earnings in the short-run while those that focused on 
human capital development took longer to experience those gains (Blank, 2002).  In the 
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long-run, on the other hand, intensive training programs appear to have more persistent 
impacts on earnings than short-term job search and readiness programs (Dyke et al., 
2006).  Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001) examine the results from twenty programs that 
randomly assigned welfare recipients into job search programs, education and training 
programs, or both.  They find that both types of programs led to an increase in the 
earnings of program recipients; however, the programs that had the most success were 
those that combined job search with education and training.  Ultimately, Bloom and 
Michalopoulos conclude that programs tailored to the individual needs of the recipient 
will be more successful at increasing earnings, and thus promoting self-sufficiency, than 
a “one-size-fits-all” approach.  This conclusion suggests that, in standardizing the work 
requirement and removing the authority of the case managers in each state to assign work 
requirements, the DRA may have actually impeded self-sufficiency rather than promoted 
it. 
While the research discussed above has shown that work requirements led to 
decreased welfare participation, there is more uncertainty regarding how those decreases 
took place.  Are recipients exiting due to increases in earned income, or are they being 
sanctioned off the welfare rolls due to noncompliance?  Fang and Keane (2004) do show 
that there is a discrepancy between welfare exits and work participation associated with 
work requirements, but they do not examine the paths through which those exits take 
place.  Some studies have examined the impact of education on the paths to exit from 
welfare.  Harris (1993) finds that more educated welfare recipients were more likely to 
find a job that paid enough so that they could immediately exit welfare, while recipients 
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with prior work experience were more likely to work while receiving welfare benefits 
and eventually become self-sufficient.  Similarly, Blank and Ruggles (1996) find that 
higher levels of education increased the likelihood of exiting welfare due to income and 
other reasons not associated with family composition. 
In contrast to the bevy of literature examining the impact of welfare reforms in the 
twentieth century, a limited number of studies have considered the impact of the DRA on 
welfare recipients.  A GAO (2010) report does find that the proportion of welfare 
recipients engaged in work activities decreased slightly nationwide following 
implementation of the DRA.  The report also finds that many states, including South 
Carolina, chose to fund certain low-income families with separate state funds, removing 
these families completely from the TANF program and excluding them from the 
calculation of the work percentage.  Shifting recipients to programs that are funded with 
separate states dollars gives the appearance that the number of families receiving 
assistance has decreased (Pavetti et al., 2009). 
 This study adds to the literature by identifying the impact of a single reform, 
namely the DRA’s definition of allowable of work activities, on the likelihood of exit 
from the TANF program in South Carolina and on the paths to exit.  As such, I am able to 
isolate the effect of this single reform rather than being faced with the task of attempting 
to estimate the impact of multiple, simultaneous, and possibly opposing, reforms.  This 
study also contributes to the literature by examining the effect of work requirements on 
the paths to exit from the TANF program.  Further, I use a difference-in-difference 
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estimator to capture the impact of the DRA’s definition of work activities on the exit 
behavior of TANF recipients in South Carolina. 
4.  Data 
The data I use in this analysis are a full extract of administrative records from the 
South Carolina FI program.  The period of analysis begins in January 2002, when the 
federal PRWORA work requirements came into full effect, and ends in September 2009, 
just prior to the changes implemented by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009.  The administrative records contain information on the household 
characteristics, demographics, and benefit receipt of each FI program participant.  I 
transform the data so that they describe spells of cash benefit receipt, where each spell 
represents a string of consecutive months of benefit receipt, with one observation per 
household per month of positive cash benefit receipt.  The spell begins when the 
household enters the FI program and receives benefits, and it ends when the household 
exits the FI program and is thus no longer receiving cash benefits. 
Given the history and demography of South Carolina, it seems plausible that 
blacks may have been differentially impacted by the DRA reform.  The demographic 
characteristics available in the administrative data allow me to identify the race of the 
each FI program participant, and I use this information to disaggregate the data into two 
subsamples.  The subsample of black households consists of those with a head of 
household who is black.  The subsample of non-black households similarly consists of 
those households whose head is not black. 
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4.1 Treatment and Control Groups 
The difference-in-difference analysis requires identification of both a treatment 
and a control group.  I identify non-exempt work-eligible households as my treatment 
group, as these are the households that were impacted by the DRA’s definition of work 
activities in South Carolina.  Non-exempt work-eligible households are those with a head 
of household who is an FI participant who is deemed work-eligible and not exempted 
from South Carolina’s work requirement.  My control group consists of exempt work-
eligible households whose youngest child is at least three months old.  This group 
provides a natural control group for the analysis because the heads of these households 
have been deemed able to work just like those in the treatment group; yet, as I described 
in Section 2.1, South Carolina has exempted them from the work requirement, making 
them not subject to the DRA’s definition of work activities.   
4.2 Sample Selection 
In order to focus on only those cases that may be impacted by the DRA, I restrict 
the dataset to cases with single heads of households who are work-eligible FI program 
participants throughout the entire spell and who are not minor parents.  This eliminates 
cases where only the children in the household receive benefits, where there are two 
parents in the household receiving benefits, and where the head of household is disabled.   
In order to limit the data inconsistencies and coding errors in the dataset, I smooth 
the data by removing one-month spells of participation and non-participation.  Finally, I 
omit left-censored spells from the dataset as I do not observe the true durations of benefit 
receipt for these households.  The final dataset consists of 38,330 spells of FI benefit 
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receipt.  For each spell of benefit receipt, the administrative data provide information on 
demographic and household characteristics such as the number of people in the 
household and the age, race, sex, and education level of each person in the household.  
The administrative data also provide the reason for exit for completed spells.  For each 
month of a spell, I merge in county-level unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  There are 21,622 households receiving FI benefits in the sample, and 
approximately seventeen percent of households experience multiple spells during the 
study period. 
For households that exit the FI program, the reason for exit in the administrative 
data provides me with information on the path to exit for my analysis.  First, I identify 
households that exit due to an increase in earned income as having employment exits.  
Second, I identify households that exit due to an increase in unearned or total income as 
having other income exits.  Third, I identify households that exit for all other reasons as 
having administrative exits.2  Twenty-six percent of spells end due to employment, five 
percent end due to increases in other income, and 64 percent end for administrative 
reasons.  The remainder of the spells are right-censored. 
4.3 Sample Statistics 
As the first column of Table 1 shows, the median spell length for the full sample 
is approximately five months.  Almost all of the households have female heads.  Sixty-
four percent of heads of households are high school graduates and 75 percent are black.  
                                                          
2 Other reasons for exit include such things as reaching the time limit, being sanctioned for failing to 
comply with program rules, and voluntarily withdrawing from the program. 
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At the start of the spell, the average age of the head of household is almost 26 years, the 
average age of the oldest child in the household is 4.6 years, and the average age of the 
youngest child in the household is almost three years. 
Columns (2) through (5) of Table 6 provide summary statistics for non-exempt 
and exempt work-eligible households before and after implementation of the DRA.  
Eighty-five percent of the monthly observations in the sample belong to the group of non-
exempt work-eligible households.  As the table shows, all three types of exits were 
slightly less common for both groups after the DRA was implemented.  This is likely due 
to the fact that spells that start in the latter period are more likely to be right-censored.  
Interestingly, though, the median spell length for both groups fell following 
implementation of the DRA.  Both groups also had a higher incidence of high school 
graduates in the post-DRA period.  Heads of non-exempt households tended to be older 
after the DRA was implemented, while the children of both groups tended to be older in 
the post-DRA period.  There was also a slightly lower incidence of female headship in 
both groups following implementation of the DRA, although the overwhelming majority 
of household heads were still female. 
5.  Methods 
This analysis employs a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the impact 
of the DRA’s definition of work activities on the exit behavior of TANF recipients in 
South Carolina.  The difference-in-difference estimator compares the changes in exit 
behavior after implementation of the DRA of TANF recipients who are and are not 
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subject to the DRA’s regulations.  I perform all analyses in this essay for the full sample 
and for the two subsamples disaggregated by race.   
The difference-in-difference estimator relies heavily on the appropriateness of the 
control group, as it attributes any unobserved differences between the treatment and 
control groups in the change in the likelihood of exit after implementation of the DRA to 
the Deficit Reduction Act itself.  Exempt work-eligible households should be very similar 
to the nonexempt work-eligible households in terms of their likelihood of exit from the 
TANF program and their labor market prospects except for the fact that the exempt work-
eligible households are not subject to the work requirement and thus not affected by the 
DRA’s definition of work activities.  The majority of households in the control group are 
exempted because they consist of a single parent with a child under the age of one.  If 
household heads with very young children are less likely to work than those with older 
children, this will compromise the appropriateness of the control group; however, as 
Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) show, most women who are working when their child is 
one year old had returned to work well before that, within three months of childbirth.  
This finding suggests that the one-year post-childbirth mark is not a critical node in 
women’s work behavior, and women with a child between three months and one year of 
age should comprise an adequate control group for women with a child over one year of 
age.  Further, FI recipients qualify for subsidized childcare, helping to remove this barrier 
to work for women with young children.  As I will show, while exempt work-eligible 
households are slower to the leave the TANF program in South Carolina than non-
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exempt work-eligible households, their patterns of exit are similar prior to 
implementation of the DRA.   
5.1 Descriptive Approach 
In analyzing the impact of the DRA’s definition of work activities on the exit 
behavior of TANF recipients in South Carolina, I take both a descriptive and multivariate 
approach.  For my descriptive analysis, I estimate Kaplan-Meier hazard rates for both 
non-exempt and exempt work-eligible households before and after the DRA was 
implemented.  The hazard rate is the probability that a household exits the TANF 
program in a particular month given that the household is still receiving benefits in that 
month.  Using these Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates, I construct difference-in-difference 
estimates of the hazard rate.  I calculate the difference-in-difference estimate as the 
difference between two differences.   First, I calculate the non-exempt difference as the 
difference between the hazard rate after and before DRA implementation for non-exempt 
work-eligible households.  I calculate the exempt difference in the same way for exempt 
work-eligible households.  Then, the difference-in-difference estimate is the difference 
between the non-exempt difference and the exempt difference.  A positive difference-in-
difference estimate suggests that the DRA’s definition of work activities increased the 
likelihood of exiting the TANF program in South Carolina, while a negative difference-
in-difference estimate suggests that the reform reduced the likelihood of exit. 
5.2 Multivariate Approach 
 For my multivariate analyses, I employ discrete-time logistic hazard and 
competing risks models under a difference-in-difference framework to estimate the effect 
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of the DRA’s definition of work activities on the likelihood of exit and on the path to exit 
from South Carolina’s TANF program.  I construct the DRA difference-in-difference 
policy variables by interacting a dummy variable for non-exempt work-eligible 
households and a dummy variable for the period in which the DRA is in effect in my 
data, from October 2006 through September 2009, with the baseline hazard.  These 
interactions result in a set of duration-specific controls for non-exempt work-eligible 
households from October 2006 through September 2009, allowing me to identify the 
effect of the DRA at various durations on the group of welfare recipients affected by the 
legislation, as compared to those who were not targeted by the reform.  Thirty-seven 
percent of observations in the sample belong to non-exempt work-eligible households in 
the post-DRA period.   
The discrete-time logistic hazard model estimates the effect of the DRA on the  
 
overall likelihood of exit from the TANF program.  I model the hazard rate, h(t), as 
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(Allison, 1984).  NonExemptt is a dummy variable for households with non-exempt work-
eligible heads, and DRAt is a dummy variable for the period in which the DRA is in 
effect.  Tt is a vector of controls for the baseline hazard and consists of a linear spline for 
months one through four, a linear spline for months five through twelve, a linear spline 
for months thirteen and up, and dummy variables at months twelve and twenty-four to 
capture key dates in South Carolina’s TANF program.  The key coefficients of interest in 
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this model are found in the vector β3.  These coefficients capture the effect of the DRA’s 
definition of work activities on non-exempt work-eligible households’ likelihood of exit 
relative to that of exempt work-eligible households at each duration.  Xt is a vector of all 
other observed exogenous variables at time t such as household size, household 
demographic characteristics, and county-level unemployment, and Ψt is a linear monthly 
time trend to control for unobserved changes over time that may impact the likelihood of 
exit.    
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity may lead to spurious negative duration 
dependence, which would bias my estimator if not controlled for.  To account for this, I 
estimate each model with a random effect, α, to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
 The competing risks model examines the effect of the DRA on the three paths to  
 
exit: employment, other income, and program administration.  Given these J = 3 paths to  
 
exit from the TANF program, I estimate, using a competing risks model, the impact of  
 
the DRA on each path-specific hazard rate (Allison, 1984).  I model the hazard rate, hj(t),  
 
for each path j as 
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where j = (1, 2, 3) represents the three paths to exit from South Carolina’s TANF 
program and all other parameters and variables are as in the discrete-time logistic hazard 
model described above. 
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A positive estimate of any parameter in β3j indicates that the DRA increased the 
likelihood that a household will exit the TANF program through path j at that duration, 
while a negative estimate of a parameter in β3j indicates that the DRA reduced the 
likelihood of exit through path j at that duration.  The baseline hazard pattern is also as 
described in the discrete-time logistic hazard model except that the equations for 
employment exits and other income exits do not include the dummy variables for month 
twenty-four due to a lack of exits through these paths in the twenty-fourth month. 
 I estimate the logistic hazard and competing risks models using the full sample of 
administrative records as well as with a subsample made up of black households and a 
subsample made up of non-black households.  I separate the sample by race to account 
for the possibility that blacks may be differentially impacted by the DRA reform.  This is 
of particular concern given the history and demography of South Carolina. 
6.  Results 
 6.1  Descriptive Results 
Figure 1 presents Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates for the full sample of non-
exempt and exempt work-eligible households before and after the DRA came into effect.  
The conditional likelihood of both groups to exit the TANF program in South Carolina 
was generally larger after the DRA was implemented.  The likelihood of exit grew 
through the first 4 months.  After the fourth month, it leveled off until the twenty-fourth 
month, reflecting the state’s twenty-four month time limit.  The spikes in the hazard 
estimates at 24 months represent a large likelihood of exit; however, very few households 
actually face this probability.  As Figure 2 shows, the majority of spells are short, ending 
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within the first five months for non-exempt work-eligible households and within the first 
seven months for exempt work-eligible households.  In fact, only ten percent of all spells 
survive past twelve months, and only 3.5 percent survive past eighteen months. 
Figure 1 also provides some insight into the appropriateness of using exempt 
work-eligible households as a control group for non-exempt work-eligible households in 
this analysis.  Panels A and C of Figure 1 show the Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates for 
the conditional likelihood of exit of both non-exempt and exempt work-eligible 
households prior to implementation of the DRA.  Through the ninth month of TANF 
benefit receipt, although the hazard rate is lower for exempt work-eligible households 
than for non-exempt households, the trend in the hazard rate is very similar for both 
groups: it increases through the first four months, decreases in months five and six, has a 
small spike in month seven before further decreasing in months eight and nine.  After 
nine months, the hazard rate of non-exempt work-eligible households is rather steady, 
with spikes in months twelve and twenty-four.  The hazard rate of exempt work-eligible 
households is more volatile due to the small number of exempt households with long 
spells; however, the hazard rate is fairly similar to that of non-exempt households at 
longer spell lengths.  The similarity of the trends in the hazard rate for non-exempt and 
exempt work-eligible households suggests that households with exempt work-eligible 
heads may provide a good comparison group for households with non-exempt work-
eligible heads; however, the difference in the levels of the hazard rates across the two 
groups, to the extent that it cannot be accounted for with observable characteristics, 
 
68 
 
indicates that there may be some limitation to the strength of exempt work-eligible 
households as a control group in this analysis. 
Figure 3 presents the Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates for the black subsample.  
The hazard rate for both non-exempt and exempt black households was larger after the 
DRA was implemented than before, particularly during the first four months of a spell.  
This suggests that both groups of black recipients were more likely to exit the TANF 
program in South Carolina early on the in the spell after the DRA was implemented. 
Figure 4 presents the Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates for the non-black subsample.  
For non-exempt non-black households, the hazard rate was larger after implementation of 
the DRA, particularly during the first eleven months of a spell.  Exempt non-black 
households did not experience the same increase in their hazard rate following the DRA’s 
implementation.  For exempt non-black households, the conditional likelihood of exit 
appears somewhat similar, if not smaller, after the DRA was implemented. 
Table 7 displays the Kaplan-Meier hazard rates presented in Figure 1 along with 
the calculation of the difference-in-difference estimate.  At most durations, the hazard 
rate experienced a small increase after implementation of the DRA for both non-exempt 
and exempt households.  This indicates that the likelihood of exiting the TANF program 
in South Carolina was generally larger after the DRA was implemented than before for 
both groups.  The difference-in-difference estimates are generally small and not 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that the impact of the DRA’s change in 
allowable work activities was limited; however, exempt households often saw a larger 
increase in the likelihood of exit than did non-exempt households, leading to a negative 
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difference-in-difference estimate at many durations. In particular, at durations of two 
months and sixteen months, the difference-in-difference estimate is negative and 
significantly different from zero, indicating that at these durations, the DRA’s definition 
of work activities may have decreased the likelihood of exit from the TANF program in 
South Carolina for non-exempt work-eligible households.  At durations of 21 and 24 
months, the difference-in-difference estimate is larger in magnitude, positive, and 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that the reform may have increased the 
likelihood of exit at these durations. 
Table 8 presents the difference-in-difference estimates calculated from the 
Kaplan-Meier hazards by exit path.  For employment exits, the DRA’s definition of 
allowable work activities appears to have had a negative impact on the likelihood of exit 
early on in spells and a positive impact at durations of 21 months.  The reform also 
appears to have had a negative impact on the likelihood of exit due to increases in other 
income at durations of four, fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen months.  On the other hand, 
while the DRA appears to have reduced the likelihood of exit for administrative reasons 
at durations of sixteen months, at other durations, it appears to have had a positive effect.  
In particular, the difference-in-difference estimates are positive and significantly different 
from zero at durations of four, nine, and 21 months, suggesting that the DRA’s definition 
of work activities may have increased the likelihood of administrative exit at these 
durations. 
Table 9 presents the difference-in-difference estimates calculated from the 
Kaplan-Meier hazards for the black subsample.  These results suggest that the DRA’s 
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definition of work activities reduced the likelihood of exit early on in spells.  For all exits 
regardless of exit path and for employment exits, the difference-in-difference estimate is 
negative and marginally significant at durations of two months.  For other income exits, 
the difference-in-difference estimate is negative and statistically significant at durations 
of four months; and for administrative exits, the difference-in-difference estimate is 
negative and marginally significant at durations of seven months.  On the other hand, the 
reform appears to have increased the likelihood of employment exits for black 
households at durations of seven months. 
Table 10 presents the difference-in-difference estimates calculated from the 
Kaplan-Meier hazards for the non-black subsample.  For all exits and administrative 
exits, the DRA’s change in allowable work activities appears to have had a strong, 
positive impact on the likelihood of exit in the fourth month.  The reform also appears to 
have had a negative, marginally significant impact on employment exits at durations of 
two months and a strong positive impact on other income exits at longer durations. 
These descriptive results provide mixed evidence of the effect of the DRA’s 
change in allowable work activities on the likelihood of exit from the TANF program in 
South Carolina.  For the full sample, the reform generally appears to have reduced the 
likelihood of exit for any reason early in spells and increased it at longer durations.  This 
finding holds for exits due to employment.  The likelihood of other income exits appears 
to have been more negatively impacted by implementation of the DRA, while it appears 
that the reform had more of a positive impact on administrative exits.  When I divide the 
sample by race, I find that the negative impact of the DRA’s definition of work activities 
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holds for blacks but not for non-blacks.  In fact, I find strong positive impacts of the 
reform for the non-black subsample.  Of course, these results do not control for 
observable factors; however, they do suggest that the DRA’s definition of work activities 
failed to have a strong, uniform impact on the hazard rate and that it may have 
differentially impacted blacks and non-blacks. 
6.2  Multivariate Results 
The first column of Table 11 presents results from a discrete-time logistic hazard 
model estimated on the full sample controlling for unobserved heterogeneity with a 
random effect.  The coefficients on the interactions between non-exempt work eligible 
households in the DRA period and the duration dependence variables are small and 
statistically insignificant.  These results suggest that the DRA’s change in allowable work 
activities had little impact on the likelihood of recipients to exit the TANF program in 
South Carolina.  However, dividing the sample by race, I find that the reform did 
differentially impact blacks and non-blacks.  The results for blacks, which are presented 
in column 2, suggest that in the first four months of a spell, the DRA’s definition of work 
activities reduced the likelihood of exit from South Carolina’s TANF program.  On the 
other hand, non-blacks appear to have benefited from an increased likelihood of exiting 
the TANF program in the first four months in response to the reform.  Given that most 
spells end within five months, it seems reasonable that the impact of the reform would be 
felt at these shorter durations. 
Household composition appears to be an important determinant of exit behavior, 
regardless of race.  Households that were headed by a woman or by someone who is 
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black were less likely to leave South Carolina’s TANF program, while households that 
were headed by a high school graduate were more likely to exit the program.  As the 
household head aged, the household became less likely to exit South Carolina’s TANF 
program.  Having children of any age reduced the likelihood of exit, but as the oldest 
child aged, that likelihood increased.  The likelihood of exiting the program increased as 
households accumulated previous months of benefit receipt and decreased as the 
unemployment rate rose.  The estimates also provide information on the baseline duration 
dependence pattern.  In all three models, the likelihood of exit increased with the duration 
of the spell and spiked at 24 months. 
Table 12 presents the coefficient estimates from the competing risks models for 
the full sample, and Tables 13 and 14 present the results for the black and non-black 
subsamples, respectively.  For the full sample, the results indicate that the DRA’s 
definition of work activities reduced the likelihood of exit due to employment in the first 
four months of the spell but had little impact on other income and administrative exits.  
The results from the model estimated on the black subsample also indicate that the reform 
reduced the likelihood of employment exit in the first four months of a spell but had little 
effect on exits through the other two paths.  In contrast, the model for non-blacks 
indicates that while the reform did not impact employment exits for this group, it did 
increase the likelihood of administrative exit in the first four months and exit due to other 
income at durations longer than 4 months. 
Having a head of household who is female or black reduced the hazard for all 
three types of exit, while a head of household who is a high school graduate had an 
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increased likelihood of exit through employment or other income but a smaller 
administrative exit hazard.  The hazard rate for all three types of exit decreased with the 
age of the household head, decreased with the number of children in the household, and 
increased with the age of the oldest child in the household. 
7.  Simulations 
 While the estimates from the logistic hazard and competing risks models provide 
information as to how the DRA’s definition of work activities impacted the hazard rate of 
TANF recipients, these models do not tell us directly what effect the reform had on spells 
of TANF receipt in South Carolina.  I conduct simulations in order to determine how the 
reform impacted the length of spells.  Using a simulated dataset based on the actual 
administrative data and the estimates from the logistic hazard and competing risks 
models, I am able to show that overall and for spells ending in employment, the DRA’s 
definition of work activities lengthened the spells of black recipients in South Carolina 
while shortening those of non-black recipients.  For spells ending due to increases in 
other income and due to administrative reasons, the reform appears to have increased 
spell lengths for both groups. 
 I begin constructing the simulated dataset using the information from the first 
month of each actual spell that started on or after October 2006 (when the DRA was first 
implemented), replicating each spell five times.  I advance each spell 36 months or up to 
September 2009, whichever comes first.  For each month of the simulated spell, I merge 
in actual county-level unemployment data from the BLS.  I also update the age 
information for each member of the household every twelve months.  Otherwise, each 
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month of a simulated spell contains the household and demographic information from the 
first month of an actual spell.  I assign unobserved heterogeneity to each spell with a 
random draw from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation estimated 
from the corresponding logistic hazard or competing risks model. 
 I conduct simulations for the full sample, for the subsample made up of black 
recipients, and for the subsample made up of non-black recipients.  For each of the three 
samples, I conduct a baseline simulation, a simulation of a scenario where the DRA is 
never implemented (the “No DRA” simulation), and a simulation of a scenario where 
everyone is subject to the DRA (the “All DRA” simulation).  For all three simulations 
and all three samples, I simulate the likelihood of any exit from the TANF program in 
South Carolina corresponding to the logistic hazard model, and I simulate the likelihood 
of exit through employment, other income, and administration corresponding to the 
competing risks model.  In all, I conduct eighteen simulations. 
 7.1  Simulation of All Exits 
 For the baseline simulation of any exit, I use the coefficient estimates from the 
logistic hazard model to calculate the probability of exit for each simulated household in 
each month and compare it to a random draw from a uniform distribution.  If the 
calculated probability of exit is greater than the random draw, I simulate exit in that 
month and the spell ends.  Otherwise, the simulated spell continues.  Figure 5 shows the 
Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates for the full sample baseline simulation for two groups: 
non-exempt households and exempt households.  As expected, the hazard estimates are 
very similar to those of the actual data in Panels B and D of Figure 1.  Table 10 shows 
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statistics for spell length.  The statistics for the full sample baseline simulation show 
slightly longer spell durations than the actual data.  Median spell length is five months for 
the baseline simulation.  Sixty-five percent of spells in the baseline simulation last at least 
four months; 39 percent last at least six months; and fourteen percent last at least twelve 
months.   
 To show what would have happened to spell length had the DRA never been 
implemented, I construct a “No DRA” simulation for the full sample where the variable 
for the DRA is always zero.  The resulting spell length statistics are reported in the third 
row of Table 10.  Had the DRA’s change in allowable work activities never come into 
effect, spells would have been slightly shorter.  The median spell length in this simulation 
is four months and 28 days, two days shorter than in the baseline simulation.  The 
fraction of spells lasting at least four, six, and twelve months is also slightly smaller.  
Sixty-four percent of spells last at least four months, 38 percent last at least six months, 
and thirteen percent last at least twelve months. 
 I also conduct a full-sample simulation to examine what spells would have looked 
like if everyone had been subject to the reform brought on by the DRA.  The results from 
this “All DRA” simulation are presented in the fourth row of Table 15.  Had the reform 
been in effect for all recipients, spells of TANF receipt in South Carolina would not have 
been much different.  The median spell length in this simulation is five months and one 
day, only one day longer than in the baseline simulation.  The fractions of spells lasting at 
least four, six, and twelve months are nearly identical to those from the baseline 
simulation. 
 
76 
 
 The remainder of Table 15 repeats the simulations by race.  For the black 
subsample, again I find that the baseline simulation overestimates median spell length as 
compared to the actual data.  In the “No DRA” simulation, I find that median spell length 
would have been six days shorter and the fractions of spells lasting four, six, and twelve 
months would have been smaller had the DRA not been implemented for blacks.  In the 
simulation where everyone is subject to the DRA’s change in allowable work activities, I 
find that median spell length is 1.5 days longer than in the baseline simulation, and the 
fractions of spells lasting six and twelve months are slightly larger. 
 For the non-black subsample, I continue to find that the baseline simulation 
overestimates median spell length.  In contrast to the simulation results for the black 
sample, I find that median spell length for non-blacks would have been longer had the 
DRA’s reform not been implemented.  In the “No DRA” simulation, median spell length 
is four months and 28 days, as opposed to four months and eighteen days in the baseline.  
The fractions of spells lasting four, six, and twelve months are also larger than in the 
baseline simulation for non-blacks.  Had all non-blacks been subject to the DRA’s change 
in allowable work activities, the results indicate that median spell length would have been 
slightly shorter than baseline at four months and seventeen days.  The fractions of spells 
lasting four, six, and twelve months would have also been slightly smaller. 
 7.2  Simulations of Exit Paths 
 To simulate exits from TANF by exit path, I use the coefficient estimates from the 
competing risks model to calculate the probability of exit for each exit path and compare 
those probabilities to a random draw from a uniform distribution.  If the probability of 
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exiting due to employment is greater than the random draw, I simulate exit in that month 
through employment.  If the random draw is greater than the probability of exit due to 
employment but less than the sum of the probabilities of exit due to employment and 
other income, I simulate exit in that month through other income.  If the random draw is 
greater than the sum of the previous two probabilities but less than the sum of all three 
probabilities, I simulate exit in that month through administrative reasons.  Otherwise, the 
simulated spell continues. 
 Table 16 presents results from the simulations of spells that end due to 
employment.  For the full sample, I find that had the DRA’s change in allowable work 
activities not come into effect, the median spell length of those spells that end in 
employment would have been approximately two days shorter.  However, the “All DRA” 
scenario does not seem to have greatly impacted median spell length of employment exit 
spells for the full sample. 
 For blacks, I find that had the reform not come into effect, the median length of 
spells that end due to employment would have been shorter and the fractions of spells 
lasting four, six, and twelve months would have been smaller.  The median length of 
employment exit spells is four months and 29 days in the baseline simulation and four 
months and 23 days in the “No DRA” simulation.  Had the DRA’s reform been in effect 
for all work-eligible households, the median spell length would have been one day longer 
than in the baseline simulation.  For the non-black sample, the median spell length in the 
“No DRA” scenario of spells that end due to employment is 22 days longer than the 
baseline, whereas the median spell length in the “All DRA” simulation is three days 
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shorter than the baseline.  These results indicate that the DRA’s definition of work 
activities slowed down exit through employment for blacks yet increased the speed at 
which non-blacks exit TANF due to employment in South Carolina. 
 Table 17 presents results from the simulations of other income exits.  For the full 
sample, I find that the DRA’s change in allowable work activities led to longer lengths of 
spells that end due to increases in other income.  Had the reform not come into effect, the 
median spell ending due to other income would have been almost five days longer, and 
had everyone been subject to the reform, the median spell ending due to other income 
would have been almost one day longer.  For the black subsample, the results from the 
simulations indicate that the DRA’s definition of work activities may have slightly 
lengthened spells that end due to increases in other income.  The results for non-blacks 
are similar yet more pronounced.  For non-blacks, I find that had everyone been subject 
to the DRA’s reform, the median spell ending due to other income would have been 
seven days longer than baseline. 
 Table 18 presents results from the simulations of administrative exits for the full 
sample and by race.  For the full sample, I find that the spells ending for administrative 
reasons would have been slighter shorter had the DRA’s change in allowable work 
activities not come into effect and slightly longer had everyone been subject to the 
reform.  For the black subsample, I find a similar result.  The median spell length in the 
“No DRA” simulation is almost three days shorter than in the baseline, while the median 
spell length in the “All DRA” simulation is three days longer than baseline.  For non-
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blacks, I find very little impact of the reform on the median length of spells that end for 
administrative reasons. 
8.  Conclusion 
 The results found here suggest that the DRA’s definition of work activities 
reduced the hazard rate for blacks but increased the hazard for non-blacks in the first four 
months of a spell.  For blacks, this decrease came from a decrease in the likelihood of 
employment exits.  For non-blacks, the increase in the hazard rate in the first four months 
of a spell came from an increase in the likelihood of administrative exits.  Results from 
simulations suggest that had the DRA’s reform not come into effect, the median spell 
would have been one fifth of a month shorter for blacks and three tenths of a month 
longer for non-blacks. 
If the DRA’s definition of work activities is thought to have promoted self-
sufficiency among TANF recipients, the results found here for blacks are 
counterintuitive; however, it is possible that the reform failed to promote self-sufficiency 
among this group in South Carolina.  The DRA imposed a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
the activities that satisfy the work requirement, and states were no longer able to tailor 
their work activities to best fit the needs of their recipient populations.  Prior research has 
shown that this is not the way to promote self-sufficiency (Bloom and Michalopoulos, 
2001).  In a state such as South Carolina, where the TANF program is less 
accommodating at the outset, this could have an especially deleterious effect, particularly 
for the most disadvantaged recipients.  Case managers, who assign work activities to 
TANF recipients in South Carolina and who may be the individuals most familiar with 
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the needs of TANF recipients, have lost authority over what can count as work for each 
recipient under the DRA and thus may be less successful in helping a TANF recipient 
achieve self-sufficiency.  If black recipients in South Carolina rely more heavily on the 
assistance of case managers in achieving self-sufficiency than do their non-black 
counterparts, then it may come as no surprise that the reform enacted by the DRA 
differentially impacted blacks and non-blacks. 
 A further consideration has to do with the definitions of the allowable work 
activities themselves.  Some activities, such as job search, were changed in such a way 
that it made it much harder for a recipient in South Carolina to satisfy the work 
requirement with that activity.  For instance prior to the DRA, a recipient in South 
Carolina who contacted ten employers in search of a job in a given week was said to have 
satisfied the thirty-hour work requirement.  Once the DRA’s change in allowable work 
activities came into effect, the amount of time allowed for each employer contact was 
reduced so that a TANF recipient may have to contact thirty or forty employers in order 
to fulfill the work requirement with job search alone.  For TANF recipients living in rural 
or more disadvantaged areas of South Carolina, there may not be that many job openings 
for a recipient to apply to; thus case managers were forced to assign recipients to other 
work activities.  If TANF recipients were being redirected into activities that are less 
successful at promoting self-sufficiency in order for the recipient to satisfy the work 
requirement, then the results of this study may come as no surprise. 
 Finally, while these results provide evidence that the DRA’s definition of work 
activities may have failed to increase the self-sufficiency of black TANF recipients in 
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South Carolina while promoting that of whites, one should be cautious before 
extrapolating the results to TANF populations in other states.  As mentioned previously, 
each state’s TANF program is unique, and South Carolina is no exception.  While the 
DRA differentially impacted black and non-black recipients in South Carolina, it did not 
necessarily have the same effect in all states across the country.  Indeed, it is possible that 
the DRA had a positive impact on all recipients in some states; more research is needed 
to determine this.  Yet for South Carolina, this study suggests that the DRA’s definition 
of work and work readiness activities may have reduced the self-sufficiency of some 
TANF recipients rather than increased it. 
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Figure 1.  Kaplan-Meier Hazard Estimates from the South Carolina Administrative Data 
 
Panel A: Non-exempt work-eligible    Panel B: Non-exempt work-eligible 
households prior to the DRA    households after the DRA 
 
 
Panel C: Exempt work-eligible households  Panel D: Exempt work-eligible households     
prior to the DRA      after the DRA 
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Figure 2.  Survival Rates Estimated from the South Carolina Administrative Data 
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Figure 3.  Kaplan-Meier Hazard Estimates for the Black Subsample 
 
Panel A: Non-exempt work-eligible    Panel B: Non-exempt work-eligible 
households prior to the DRA    households after the DRA 
 
 
Panel C: Exempt work-eligible households  Panel D: Exempt work-eligible households 
prior to the DRA     after the DRA  
 
  
 
85 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Spell Duration (months) 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Spell Duration (months) 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Spell Duration (months) 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Spell Duration (months) 
Figure 4.  Kaplan-Meier Hazard Estimates for the Non-Black Subsample 
 
Panel A: Non-exempt work-eligible    Panel B: Non-exempt work-eligible    
households prior to the DRA    households after the DRA 
 
Panel C: Exempt work-eligible households   Panel D: Exempt work-eligible households 
prior to the DRA      after the DRA 
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Figure 5.  Kaplan-Meier Hazard Estimates from the Baseline Simulation 
 
Panel A: Non-exempt work-eligible    Panel B: Exempt work-eligible 
households after the DRA    households after the DRA 
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Table 6.  Summary Statistics  
Characteristics of the 
Spells 
Full Sample 
Non-exempt 
Households 
Prior to DRA 
Non-exempt 
Households 
After DRA 
Exempt 
Households 
Prior to DRA 
Exempt 
Households 
After DRA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Employment Exit 0.260 0.277 0.227 0.298 0.282 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) 
Other Income Exit 0.054 0.059 0.051 0.05 0.034 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Administrative Exit 0.642 0.664 0.625 0.652 0.574 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age of Head of Household 
at Start of Spell 
25.8 25.9 26.3 24.4 24.3 
(0.030) (0.043) (0.053) (0.092) (0.089) 
Age of Oldest Child at 
Start of Spell 
4.6 4.4 5.2 3.2 3.7 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.030) (0.053) (0.063) 
Age of Youngest Child at 
Start of Spell 
2.9 3 3.4 1.5 1.6 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.025) (0.041) (0.043) 
Median Spell Length 
(months) 4.98 4.98 4.74 6.86 5.93 
Number of Spells 38,330 18,530 14,333 2,681 2,786 
Characteristics of the Households  
Female Head of 
Household 
0.978 0.978 0.971 0.995 0.992 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
High School Graduate 0.635 0.607 0.636 0.693 0.779 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) 
Black 0.746 0.742 0.733 0.789 0.788 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
Number of Households 21,622 11,797 6,428 1,874 1,523 
Time-varying Characteristics  
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Non-Exempt * DRA Time 
Period 
0.367 0 1 0 0 
(0.001) 
    DRA Time Period 0.452 0 1 0 1 
 
(0.001) 
    Non-Exempt 0.849 1 1 0 0 
 
(0.001) 
    Age of Head of Household 25.7 25.8 26 24.7 24.5 
 
(0.013) (0.019) (0.023) (0.042) (0.035) 
Age of Oldest Child 4.6 4.4 5.1 3.6 4.1 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.024) (0.025) 
Age of Youngest Child 2.8 3.0 3.2 1.4 1.5 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) 
Number of Children Age 
0-2 
0.669 0.586 0.635 0.999 1.035 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) 
Number of Children Age 
3-5 
0.583 0.625 0.559 0.5 0.516 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of Children Age 
6-11 
0.418 0.383 0.501 0.296 0.354 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of Children Age 
12-14 
0.027 0.01 0.056 0.004 0.022 
(<0.000) (<0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of Children Age 
15-17 
0.004 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 
(<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) 
Total months of benefit 
receipt 
9.7 8.6 11.2 7.7 10.7 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.030) (0.050) (0.059) 
Unemployment Rate 0.078 0.073 0.086 0.071 0.081 
 
(<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) 
Number of Observations 192,814 92,825 70,842 12,916 16,231 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.         
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 Table 7.  Kaplan-Meier Hazard Rates and Difference-in-Difference Estimates for All Exits 
  
Non-Exempt Work-
Eligible Households 
Exempt Work-
Eligible Households Non-
Exempt 
Difference 
Exempt 
Difference 
Difference-in-
Difference 
 
Before 
DRA 
After 
DRA 
Before 
DRA 
After 
DRA 
Duration (1) (2) (3) (4) (2) - (1) (4) - (3) [(2) - (1)] - [(4) - (3)] 
2 months 0.142 0.167 0.099 0.141 0.025 0.042 -0.017 * 
3 months 0.22 0.245 0.137 0.177 0.025 0.04 -0.015 
4 months 0.258 0.281 0.18 0.186 0.023 0.006 0.017 
5 months 0.199 0.213 0.131 0.148 0.014 0.017 -0.003 
6 months 0.193 0.206 0.113 0.129 0.013 0.016 -0.003 
7 months 0.196 0.205 0.137 0.146 0.009 0.009 0 
8 months 0.175 0.193 0.119 0.141 0.018 0.022 -0.004 
9 months 0.165 0.199 0.111 0.112 0.034 0.001 0.033 
10 months 0.17 0.191 0.141 0.148 0.021 0.007 0.014 
11 months 0.162 0.174 0.145 0.148 0.012 0.003 0.009 
12 months 0.206 0.199 0.133 0.151 -0.007 0.018 -0.025 
13 months 0.191 0.203 0.157 0.132 0.012 -0.025 0.037 
14 months 0.162 0.169 0.135 0.111 0.007 -0.024 0.031 
15 months 0.151 0.156 0.119 0.131 0.005 0.012 -0.007 
16 months 0.169 0.124 0.081 0.164 -0.045 0.083 -0.128 *** 
17 months 0.163 0.133 0.078 0.111 -0.03 0.033 -0.063 
18 months 0.143 0.206 0.156 0.177 0.063 0.021 0.042 
19 months 0.165 0.16 0.13 0.178 -0.005 0.048 -0.053 
20 months 0.195 0.149 0.159 0.188 -0.046 0.029 -0.075 
21 months 0.14 0.171 0.188 0 0.031 -0.188 0.219 *** 
22 months 0.152 0.134 0.227 0.158 -0.018 -0.069 0.051 
23 months 0.132 0.117 0 0.125 -0.015 0.125 -0.14 
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24 months 0.563 0.629 0.643 0.364 0.066 -0.279 0.345 * 
Note: There are a total of 38,676 spells of TANF benefit receipt.  There are no exits in the first month.  * indicates 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 8.  Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Kaplan-Meier 
Hazard Rates by Exit Path 
Duration 
Employment 
Exits 
Other Income 
Exits 
Administrative 
Exits 
2 months -0.017 *** 0.001 -0.001 
3 months -0.021 *** 0.004 0.001 
4 months -0.014 -0.007 ** 0.038 *** 
5 months -0.01 0.002 0.003 
6 months -0.007 0.006 -0.006 
7 months 0.017 0.005 -0.022 
8 months -0.012 -0.007 0.015 
9 months 0.002 -0.002 0.033 * 
10 months -0.018 0.004 0.028 
11 months -0.01 0.004 0.015 
12 months -0.02 -0.002 -0.003 
13 months -0.008 0.004 0.04 
14 months -0.008 -0.005 0.043 
15 months -0.008 -0.011 * 0.012 
16 months -0.022 -0.015 * -0.091 ** 
17 months -0.008 -0.004 * -0.051 
18 months 0.029 0.011 0 
19 months -0.037 -0.002 -0.015 
20 months -0.06 0.016 -0.031 
21 months 0.086 * 0.006 0.127 * 
22 months 0.02 0.001 0.03 
23 months -0.058 -0.008 -0.075 
24 months 0.078 0.071 0.194 
Note: There are a total of 38,676 spells of TANF benefit receipt.  
There are no exits in the first month.  * indicates significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at 
the 1% level. 
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Table 9.  Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Kaplan-Meier Hazard Rates for the 
Black Subsample 
Duration All Exits 
Employment 
Exits 
Other Income 
Exits 
Administrative 
Exits 
2 months -0.020* -0.036* 0.015 -0.016 
3 months -0.014 -0.038 0.039 -0.008 
4 months -0.010 -0.037 -0.223** 0.030 
5 months -0.007 -0.023 0.040 0.009 
6 months -0.005 0.001 0.162 0.000 
7 months -0.01 0.106** 0.059 -0.040* 
8 months -0.013 0.010 -0.206 0.004 
9 months 0.025 0.079 -0.036 0.046 
10 months 0.007 0.002 0.176 0.025 
11 months -0.008 -0.048 0.315 0.011 
12 months -0.019 -0.038 -0.170 0.008 
13 months 0.034 -0.034 0.543 0.074 
14 months 0.029 -0.094 -0.018 0.090* 
15 months 0 -0.077 -0.313 0.058 
16 months -0.113** -0.201 
 
-0.087 
17 months -0.031 0.053 
 
-0.028 
18 months 0.067 0.241 
 
0.035 
19 months -0.107 -0.368 
 
-0.069 
20 months -0.013 -1.015*** 
 
0.016 
21 months 0.199** 
  
0.193** 
22 months 0.02 
  
0.001 
23 months -0.159 
  
-0.106 
24 months 0.299 
  
0.202 
Note: There are a total of 30,183 spells of TANF benefit receipt among black 
households.  There are no exits in the first month.  Estimates are not calculated for 
employment exits past 20 months and for other income estimates past 15 months 
due to a lack of exits at these longer durations.  * indicates significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 10.  Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Kaplan-Meier Hazard Rates for the 
Non-Black Subsample 
Duration All Exits 
Employment 
Exits 
Other Income 
Exits 
Administrative 
Exits 
2 months -0.012 -0.072* 0.080 0.006 
3 months -0.014 -0.107 -0.059 0.025 
4 months 0.141*** 0.069 0.130 0.185*** 
5 months 0.018 0.034 -0.109 0.028 
6 months 0.007 0.022 -0.020 0.023 
7 months 0.05 0.008 0.649*** 0.036 
8 months 0.044 -0.047 -0.048 0.105* 
9 months 0.078 0.010 0.185 0.116* 
10 months 0.056 -0.042 0.086 0.089 
11 months 0.118 0.113 0.127 0.119 
12 months -0.041 -0.328** 0.958*** -0.002 
13 months 0.097 -0.222 
 
0.179 
14 months 0.061 0.064 
 
0.138 
15 months -0.041 -0.159 
 
0.030 
16 months -0.222** -0.030 
 
-0.312* 
17 months -0.265** -0.360* 
 
-0.179 
18 months -0.139 -0.417 
 
0.059 
19 months 0.409* -0.161 
 
0.564** 
20 months -0.507** -1.214*** 
 
-0.295 
21 months 0.393 
  
0.492 
22 months 0.145 
   23 months 0.024 
   24 months 0.933*** 
   Note: There are a total of 8,493 spells of TANF benefit receipt among non-black 
households.  There are no exits in the first month.  Estimates are not calculated for 
employment exits past 20 months, for other income estimates past 12 months, and 
for administrative exits past 21 months due to a lack of exits at these longer 
durations.  * indicates significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 11.  Discrete-time Logistic Hazard Estimates  
 
Full Sample 
Black 
Subsample 
Non-black 
Subsample 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Female -1.367 ***  -1.746 *** -1.033 *** 
 
(0.051)     (0.069)    (0.088) 
High School Graduate  0.117 ***   0.123 ***  0.057 *   
 
(0.016)     (0.019)    (0.032) 
Black -0.369 *** 
  
 
(0.020) 
  Age of Household Head -0.012 ***  -0.009 *** -0.024 *** 
 
(0.001)     (0.002)    (0.003) 
Age of Oldest Child  0.056 ***   0.056 ***  0.063 *** 
 
(0.006)     (0.007)    (0.013) 
Age of Youngest Child -0.042 ***  -0.050 *** -0.027 **  
 
(0.006)     (0.007)    (0.012) 
Number of Children Age 0-2 -0.302 ***  -0.335 *** -0.262 *** 
 
(0.020)     (0.023)    (0.044) 
Number of Children Age 3-5 -0.210 ***  -0.203 *** -0.283 *** 
 
(0.016)     (0.018)    (0.037) 
Number of Children Age 6-11 -0.132 ***  -0.114 *** -0.205 *** 
 
(0.021)     (0.023)    (0.046) 
Number of Children Age 12-14 -0.096 *    -0.075     -0.138     
 
(0.050)     (0.058)    (0.103) 
Number of Children Age 15-17 -0.209 *    -0.380 ***  0.091     
 
(0.109)     (0.130)    (0.225) 
Total Months of Benefit Receipt  0.024 ***   0.024 ***  0.018 *** 
 
(0.001)     (0.001)    (0.003) 
Unemployment Rate -5.151 ***  -5.445 *** -4.766 *** 
 
(0.303)     (0.347)    (0.642) 
Baseline Duration Dependence 
   Spline 1-4 Months  0.134 ***  0.126 ***  0.143 *** 
 
(0.020)    (0.023)    (0.045) 
   Spline 5-12 Months  0.015      0.033 *   -0.052     
 
(0.016)    (0.018)    (0.040) 
   Spline 13+ Months  0.055 **   0.050 *    0.100     
 
(0.027)    (0.028)    (0.080) 
   Dummy 12th Month  0.129      0.094      0.278     
 
(0.216)    (0.233)    (0.591) 
   Dummy 24th Month  2.377 ***  2.276 ***  2.031     
 
(0.592)    (0.603)    (1.543) 
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Non-exempt work-eligible households interacted with 
   Spline 1-4 Months  0.155 ***  0.165 ***   0.119 *** 
 
(0.012)    (0.014)     (0.025) 
   Spline 5-12 Months -0.037 **  -0.046 ***   0.009     
 
(0.015)    (0.017)     (0.038) 
   Spline 13+ Months -0.004     -0.001      -0.038     
 
(0.027)    (0.029)     (0.079) 
   Dummy 12th Month  0.249      0.228       0.305     
 
(0.224)    (0.243)     (0.603) 
   Dummy 24th Month -0.638     -0.562       0.034     
 
(0.609)    (0.622)     (1.507) 
Post-DRA period interacted with 
   Spline 1-4 Months  0.043 ***  0.066 *** -0.039  
 
(0.016)    (0.018)    (0.036) 
   Spline 5-12 Months -0.003     -0.015      0.047  
 
(0.018)    (0.020)    (0.048) 
   Spline 13+ Months -0.018     -0.019     -0.003  
 
(0.031)    (0.033)    (0.094) 
   Dummy 12th Month  0.148      0.180      0.021  
 
(0.263)    (0.283)    (0.726) 
   Dummy 24th Month  0.147      0.389     -0.065  
 
(0.725)    (0.749)    (0.641) 
Non-exempt work-eligible households in the post-DRA period interacted with 
   Spline 1-4 Months -0.017  -0.037 **  0.070 **  
 
(0.016) (0.018)   (0.035) 
   Spline 5-12 Months  0.003   0.009    -0.021     
 
(0.020) (0.022)   (0.051) 
   Spline 13+ Months  0.013   0.023    -0.044     
 
(0.032) (0.034)   (0.095) 
   Dummy 12th Month -0.101  -0.019    -0.547     
 
(0.278) (0.301)   (0.759) 
   Dummy 24th Month  0.127  -0.093    
 
 
(0.754) (0.780) 
 Time Trend  0.001   0.000     0.001     
 
(0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) 
Log Likelihood -92704.33 -73345.10 -19381.31 
Number of Monthly Observations 192,814 155,555 37,259 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  The model for non-blacks omits the dummy 
variable for month 24 duration for non-exempt work-eligible households in the post-
DRA period due to a lack of exits of this group in the 24th month.  * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 12.  Competing Risks Estimates for the Full Sample   
 
Employment 
Exits 
Other 
Income Exits 
Administrative 
Exits 
Female  -2.274 *** -2.820 *** -1.848 *** 
 
 (0.082) (0.124) (0.072) 
High School Graduate   0.586 ***  0.769 *** -0.079 *** 
 
 (0.028) (0.059) (0.020) 
Black  -0.485 *** -0.390 *** -0.457 *** 
 
 (0.032) (0.061) (0.026) 
Age of Household Head  -0.019 *** -0.023 *** -0.023 *** 
 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Age of Oldest Child   0.094 ***  0.163 ***  0.063 *** 
 
 (0.010) (0.020) (0.008) 
Age of Youngest Child  -0.109 *** -0.158 *** -0.035 *** 
 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.007) 
Number of Children Age 0-2  -0.512 *** -1.207 *** -0.329 *** 
 
 (0.033) (0.068) (0.025) 
Number of Children Age 3-5  -0.341 *** -0.798 *** -0.236 *** 
 
 (0.026) (0.056) (0.021) 
Number of Children Age 6-11  -0.275 *** -0.585 *** -0.104 *** 
 
 (0.035) (0.072) (0.026) 
Number of Children Age 12-14  -0.300 *** -0.517 *** -0.018     
 
 (0.090) (0.157) (0.062) 
Number of Children Age 15-17  -0.555 *** -0.681 **  -0.125     
 
 (0.192) (0.288) (0.139) 
Total Months of Benefit Receipt   0.008 ***  0.003      0.036 *** 
 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Unemployment Rate -14.532 ***  2.361 *** -4.351 *** 
 
 (0.505) (0.852) (0.376) 
Baseline Duration Dependence 
      Spline 1-4 Months  0.318 *** -0.094 *  0.223 *** 
 
(0.032) (0.054) (0.028) 
   Spline 5-12 Months  0.056 **   0.114 *  0.072 *** 
 
(0.027) (0.061) (0.020) 
   Spline 13+ Months  0.086 *    0.073    0.089 *** 
 
(0.045) (0.086) (0.031) 
   Dummy 12th Month -0.087     -0.379    0.190     
 
(0.422) (1.085) (0.250) 
   Dummy 24th Month 
  
 1.954 *** 
   
(0.598) 
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Non-exempt work-eligible households interacted with 
    Spline 1-4 Months  0.164 ***  0.172 ***  0.175 *** 
 
(0.019) (0.042) (0.015) 
   Spline 5-12 Months -0.029     -0.096     -0.034 *   
 
(0.026) (0.063) (0.019) 
   Spline 13+ Months -0.018      0.002     -0.021     
 
(0.046) (0.091) (0.032) 
   Dummy 12th Month  0.444      0.592      0.137     
 
(0.436) (1.122) (0.260) 
   Dummy 24th Month 
  
 0.102     
   
(0.617) 
Post-DRA period interacted with 
     Spline 1-4 Months  0.060 **  0.077    0.053 *** 
 
(0.026) (0.059) (0.020) 
   Spline 5-12 Months  0.017     0.023   -0.003     
 
(0.031) (0.081) (0.023) 
   Spline 13+ Months -0.048    -0.147   -0.022     
 
(0.059) (0.172) (0.035) 
   Dummy 12th Month  0.251    -0.633    0.125     
 
(0.496) (1.520) (0.306) 
   Dummy 24th Month 
  
 0.909     
   
(0.731) 
Non-exempt work-eligible households in the post-DRA period interacted with 
   Spline 1-4 Months -0.056 **  0.035   -0.003  
 
(0.025) (0.059) (0.020) 
   Spline 5-12 Months  0.015    -0.013   -0.010  
 
(0.034) (0.085) (0.024) 
   Spline 13+ Months  0.022     0.104    0.028  
 
(0.062) (0.179) (0.036) 
   Dummy 12th Month -0.203     0.002   -0.046  
 
(0.521) (1.606) (0.324) 
   Dummy 24th Month 
  
-0.714  
   
(0.761) 
Time Trend  0.003 *** -0.009 *** < 0.000  
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Note: The omitted category is "no exit."  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * 
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 
1% level. 
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Table 13.  Competing Risks Estimates for the Black Subsample   
 
Employment 
Exits 
Other 
Income Exits 
Administrative 
Exits 
Female  -2.913 ***  -3.364 *** -2.438 *** 
 
 (0.109)  (0.160) (0.099) 
High School Graduate   0.632 ***   0.801 *** -0.088 *** 
 
 (0.033)  (0.070) (0.024) 
Age of Household Head  -0.014 ***  -0.014 *** -0.020 *** 
 
 (0.003)  (0.005) (0.002) 
Age of Oldest Child   0.094 ***   0.150 ***  0.064 *** 
 
 (0.011)  (0.022) (0.009) 
Age of Youngest Child  -0.118 ***  -0.185 *** -0.041 *** 
 
 (0.011)  (0.021) (0.009) 
Number of Children Age 0-2  -0.546 ***  -1.316 *** -0.356 *** 
 
 (0.038)  (0.078) (0.029) 
Number of Children Age 3-5  -0.347 ***  -0.803 *** -0.222 *** 
 
 (0.030)  (0.064) (0.024) 
Number of Children Age 6-11  -0.255 ***  -0.504 *** -0.089 *** 
 
 (0.040)  (0.080) (0.030) 
Number of Children Age 12-14  -0.206 **   -0.403 **  -0.018     
 
 (0.103)  (0.180) (0.074) 
Number of Children Age 15-17  -0.562 ***  -0.637 **  -0.439 **  
 
 (0.206)  (0.319) (0.177) 
Total Months of Benefit Receipt   0.007 ***   0.003      0.038 *** 
 
 (0.003)  (0.005) (0.002) 
Unemployment Rate -14.771 ***   1.874 **  -4.795 *** 
 
 (0.576) (0.955) (0.438) 
Baseline Duration Dependence 
      Spline 1-4 Months  0.341 *** -0.033    0.232 *** 
 
(0.037) (0.060) (0.032) 
   Spline 5-12 Months  0.086 ***  0.068    0.097 *** 
 
(0.029) (0.068) (0.022) 
   Spline 13+ Months  0.087 *    0.145    0.087 *** 
 
(0.046) (0.089) (0.034) 
   Dummy 12th Month -0.061     
 
 0.186     
 
(0.428) 
 
(0.271) 
   Dummy 24th Month 
  
 1.817 *** 
   
(0.623) 
Non-exempt work-eligible households interacted with 
    Spline 1-4 Months  0.164 ***  0.164 ***  0.198 *** 
 
99 
 
 
(0.022) (0.046) (0.018) 
   Spline 5-12 Months -0.039     -0.045     -0.045 **  
 
(0.029) (0.069) (0.021) 
   Spline 13+ Months -0.023     -0.050     -0.018     
 
(0.048) (0.094) (0.034) 
   Dummy 12th Month  0.364     
 
 0.076     
 
(0.445) 
 
(0.283) 
   Dummy 24th Month 
  
 0.232     
   
(0.644) 
Post-DRA period interacted with 
     Spline 1-4 Months  0.072 **  0.062   0.084 *** 
 
(0.029) (0.065) (0.023) 
   Spline 5-12 Months  0.002     0.081  -0.016     
 
(0.034) (0.086) (0.025) 
   Spline 13+ Months -0.060    -0.184  -0.023     
 
(0.062) (0.173) (0.037) 
   Dummy 12th Month  0.200    
 
 0.145     
 
(0.512) 
 
(0.330) 
   Dummy 24th Month 
  
 1.190     
   
(0.767) 
Non-exempt work-eligible households in the post-DRA period interacted with 
   Spline 1-4 Months -0.063 **  0.060   -0.037   
 
(0.029) (0.065) (0.023) 
   Spline 5-12 Months  0.027    -0.085   -0.004   
 
(0.036) (0.091) (0.027) 
   Spline 13+ Months  0.039     0.140    0.042   
 
(0.065) (0.181) (0.039) 
   Dummy 12th Month -0.041    
 
 0.061   
 
(0.542) 
 
(0.352) 
   Dummy 24th Month 
  
-1.025   
   
(0.801) 
Time Trend  0.002 ** -0.010 *** -0.001   
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Note: The omitted category is "no exit."  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * 
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 
1% level. 
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Table 14.  Competing Risks Estimates for the Non-Black Subsample 
 
Employment 
Exits 
Other 
Income Exits 
Administrative 
Exits 
Female  -1.685 *** -2.372 *** -1.335 *** 
 
 (0.140) (0.203) (0.120) 
High School Graduate   0.397 ***  0.552 *** -0.097 **  
 
 (0.053) (0.112) (0.040) 
Age of Household Head  -0.038 *** -0.051 *** -0.037 *** 
 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) 
Age of Oldest Child   0.111 ***  0.229 ***  0.068 *** 
 
 (0.022) (0.045) (0.017) 
Age of Youngest Child  -0.094 *** -0.083 **  -0.028 *   
 
 (0.021) (0.040) (0.015) 
Number of Children Age 0-2  -0.488 *** -0.901 *** -0.335 *** 
 
 (0.072) (0.152) (0.055) 
Number of Children Age 3-5  -0.392 *** -0.836 *** -0.359 *** 
 
 (0.059) (0.128) (0.047) 
Number of Children Age 6-11  -0.395 *** -0.934 *** -0.183 *** 
 
 (0.081) (0.163) (0.057) 
Number of Children Age 12-14  -0.559 *** -0.975 *** -0.005     
 
 (0.198) (0.340) (0.125) 
Number of Children Age 15-17  -1.086 **  -1.290 *    0.389     
 
 (0.539) (0.707) (0.257) 
Total Months of Benefit Receipt   0.010 *   -0.006      0.027 *** 
 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) 
Unemployment Rate -15.010 ***  3.115     -3.829 *** 
 
 (1.104) (1.941) (0.779) 
Baseline Duration Dependence 
      Spline 1-4 Months  0.275 *** -0.267 **  0.240 *** 
 
(0.071) (0.128) (0.060) 
   Spline 5-12 Months -0.108      0.268 **  0.009     
 
(0.082) (0.117) (0.046) 
   Spline 13+ Months -0.051     
 
 0.150 *   
 
(0.555) 
 
(0.085) 
   Dummy 12th Month 
  
 0.190     
   
(0.671) 
   Dummy 24th Month 
  
 2.444 *** 
   
(0.315) 
Non-exempt work-eligible households interacted with 
    Spline 1-4 Months  0.166 ***  0.227 **  0.109 *** 
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(0.044) (0.108) (0.031) 
   Spline 5-12 Months  0.112     -0.215 *   0.013     
 
(0.081) (0.119) (0.044) 
   Spline 13+ Months  0.140     
 
-0.072     
 
(0.555) 
 
(0.085) 
   Dummy 12th Month 
  
 0.306     
   
(0.686) 
Post-DRA period interacted with 
     Spline 1-4 Months  0.017    0.203   -0.068  
 
(0.060) (0.147) (0.045) 
   Spline 5-12 Months  0.159 * -0.334 *  0.055  
 
(0.094) (0.197) (0.057) 
   Spline 13+ Months  0.184   
 
-0.028  
 
(0.561) 
 
(0.104) 
   Dummy 12th Month 
  
 0.036  
   
(0.840) 
Non-exempt work-eligible households in the post-DRA period interacted with 
   Spline 1-4 Months -0.010   -0.122    0.132 *** 
 
(0.059) (0.146) (0.044) 
   Spline 5-12 Months -0.140    0.368 * -0.031     
 
(0.097) (0.205) (0.059) 
   Spline 13+ Months -0.204   
 
-0.028     
 
(0.563) 
 
(0.105) 
   Dummy 12th Month 
  
-0.459     
   
(0.877) 
Time Trend  0.003 * -0.008 ** < 0.000  
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
Note: The omitted category is "no exit."  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * 
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 
1% level. 
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Table 15.  Simulation Results for All Exits  
 
Median Spell 
Length 
(months) 
Fraction of Spells Lasting At Least: 
 
Four Months Six Months 
Twelve 
Months 
Full Sample 
    Actual Data 4.84 0.64 0.38 0.11 
Baseline Simulation 5.01 0.65 0.39 0.14 
No DRA Simulation 4.93 0.64 0.38 0.13 
All  DRA Simulation 5.03 0.65 0.40 0.14 
Black Subsample 
    Actual Data 4.93 0.66 0.39 0.12 
Baseline Simulation 5.14 0.67 0.41 0.14 
No DRA Simulation 4.94 0.65 0.38 0.13 
All  DRA Simulation 5.19 0.67 0.42 0.15 
Non-Black Subsample 
    Actual Data 4.51 0.59 0.32 0.07 
Baseline Simulation 4.61 0.60 0.33 0.09 
No DRA Simulation 4.92 0.64 0.38 0.11 
All  DRA Simulation 4.57 0.59 0.32 0.08 
Note: The "No DRA" simulation estimates what would have happened to spell length in the 
absence of the DRA.  The "All DRA" simulation predicts what would have happened had all 
work-eligible households been subject to the DRA beginning in October 2006.  The data used 
for this table include spells that are right-censored.  The statistics from the actual data are 
calculated using spells that start in the post-DRA period. 
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Table 16.  Simulation Results for Employment Exits  
 
Median Spell 
Length 
(months) 
Fraction of Spells Lasting At Least: 
 
Four Months Six Months 
Twelve 
Months 
Full Sample 
    Actual Data 4.73 0.66 0.34 0.07 
Baseline Simulation 4.82 0.64 0.36 0.09 
No DRA Simulation 4.74 0.63 0.34 0.08 
All  DRA Simulation 4.81 0.63 0.39 0.09 
Black Subsample 
    Actual Data 4.81 0.68 0.36 0.08 
Baseline Simulation 4.97 0.66 0.38 0.09 
No DRA Simulation 4.77 0.64 0.34 0.07 
All  DRA Simulation 5.01 0.66 0.39 0.10 
Non-Black Subsample 
    Actual Data 4.44 0.60 0.27 0.04 
Baseline Simulation 4.42 0.57 0.29 0.06 
No DRA Simulation 5.14 0.66 0.40 0.10 
All  DRA Simulation 4.31 0.55 0.27 0.05 
Note:  The "No DRA" simulation estimates what would have happened to spell length in the 
absence of the DRA.  The "All DRA" simulation predicts what would have happened had all 
work-eligible households been subject to the DRA beginning in October 2006.  Statistics are 
calculated for spells that end in employment.  The data used for this table do not include spells 
that exit for other reasons or spells that are right-censored.  The statistics from the actual data 
are calculated using spells that start in the post-DRA period. 
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Table 17.  Simulation Results for Other Income Exits  
 
Median Spell 
Length 
(months) 
Fraction of Spells Lasting At Least: 
 
Four Months Six Months 
Twelve 
Months 
Full Sample 
    Actual Data 4.10 0.52 0.25 0.04 
Baseline Simulation 3.86 0.47 0.24 0.03 
No DRA Simulation 3.70 0.44 0.21 0.03 
All  DRA Simulation 3.88 0.48 0.25 0.04 
Black Subsample 
    Actual Data 4.16 0.53 0.26 0.04 
Baseline Simulation 3.95 0.49 0.25 0.04 
No DRA Simulation 3.92 0.48 0.27 0.05 
All  DRA Simulation 3.98 0.50 0.24 0.04 
Non-Black Subsample 
    Actual Data 3.86 0.47 0.20 0.03 
Baseline Simulation 3.36 0.36 0.16 0.03 
No DRA Simulation 3.35 0.32 0.08 0.00 
All  DRA Simulation 3.60 0.42 0.24 0.07 
Note: The "No DRA" simulation estimates what would have happened to spell length in the 
absence of the DRA.  The "All DRA" simulation predicts what would have happened had all 
work-eligible households been subject to the DRA beginning in October 2006.  Statistics are 
calculated for spells that end due to increases in other income.  The data used for this table do 
not include spells that exit for other reasons or spells that are right-censored.  The statistics 
from the actual data are calculated using spells that start in the post-DRA period. 
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Table 18.  Simulation Results for Administrative Exits  
 
Median Spell 
Length 
(months) 
Fraction of Spells Lasting At Least: 
 
Four Months Six Months 
Twelve 
Months 
Full Sample 
    Actual Data 4.57 0.59 0.33 0.08 
Baseline Simulation 4.54 0.59 0.31 0.08 
No DRA Simulation 4.50 0.59 0.31 0.07 
All  DRA Simulation 4.56 0.59 0.32 0.08 
Black Subsample 
    Actual Data 4.65 0.60 0.35 0.09 
Baseline Simulation 4.67 0.62 0.33 0.08 
No DRA Simulation 4.58 0.60 0.31 0.07 
All  DRA Simulation 4.68 0.62 0.33 0.08 
Non-Black Subsample 
    Actual Data 4.29 0.55 0.29 0.05 
Baseline Simulation 4.30 0.55 0.28 0.06 
No DRA Simulation 4.31 0.55 0.29 0.05 
All  DRA Simulation 4.32 0.55 0.28 0.06 
Note: The "No DRA" simulation estimates what would have happened to spell length in the 
absence of the DRA.  The "All DRA" simulation predicts what would have happened had all 
work-eligible households been subject to the DRA beginning in October 2006.  Statistics are 
calculated for spells that end for administrative reasons.  The data used for this table do not 
include spells that exit for other reasons or spells that are right-censored.  The statistics from 
the actual data are calculated using spells that start in the post-DRA period. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
WHAT HAPPENED TO CASH ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES? 
 
 
Coauthored with David C. Ribar 
 
 
1.  Goals of Social Assistance 
Controversy has surrounded the federally-supported cash assistance program for 
poor families with children since its inception in the Social Security Act of 1935.1  
Originally called the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, it was rechristened the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program following reforms in 1962 
and later the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program following 
reforms in 1996. Part of the controversy likely stems from the program’s costs; empirical 
studies have found that taxpayer support for transfers falls when the cost of assistance 
increases (Gramlich 1982; Moffitt 1990; Orr 1976; Ribar and Wilhelm 1999).  However, 
more controversy seems to center on the ways that means-tested programs work at cross-
purposes, alleviating the immediate condition of poverty while at the same time 
encouraging behaviors that can lead families into poverty. 
 
                                                          
1 The controversies leading up to the creation of the AFDC program in 1935 are documented in Gordon 
(1994).  Evidence of later controversies can be seen in the major presidential candidates from John 
Kennedy to George W. Bush calling for major reforms to the program. 
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What are the goals of cash assistance programs for poor families with children, 
and given the attendant costs, why would broad sets of taxpayers ever support them? 
Rational self-interest might be one motivation—taxpayers might want a safety net in 
place in case they ever fall on hard times. Though reasonable, selfishness seems like an 
incomplete explanation because few people would ever have the need for this assistance. 
Hochman and Rodgers (1969) proposed a more universal motivation, theorizing that 
taxpayers are partially altruistic and care not only about their own well-being but also 
about the well-being of others, such as disadvantaged families.  Even with this 
explanation, however, the question remains of how best to improve the well-being of 
disadvantaged families.  
On the one hand, transferring money to people improves their well-being by 
giving them more resources to use to purchase goods and services. On the other hand, 
transferring money to a family also changes the incentives for that family to earn income 
on its own and may even encourage the family to expand its needs. 
We can consider some of these incentives for work. The vast majority of people 
get their incomes through work and earnings. If people value the time they spend away 
from their jobs (or dislike the time they spend at their jobs), transferring money to them 
will reduce their incentives to work, lowering their earnings and making them poorer in 
terms of non-transfer income. Worse from an incentives standpoint, the process of 
means-testing in cash welfare programs causes the eligibility for and amount of 
assistance to fall as a person’s pre-transfer income increases. Means-testing is intended to 
limit assistance to those who need it most, but it has the unintended effect of acting as an 
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extra tax on the earnings of program recipients, lowering the rewards associated with 
work. In some cases, including the TANF programs currently operating in some states 
today, benefits are docked exactly one dollar for each dollar earned in pre-transfer 
income, completely eliminating the financial incentive to work among people who 
command low hourly wages or can only work a few hours per week. 
In addition to the short-term effects on work, welfare programs may encourage 
other behaviors that contribute to poverty over the longer term (Murray 1984).  Because 
the AFDC/TANF program is only available for households with children, it may 
encourage people to have more children than they otherwise would. Rules that have 
either limited welfare to single parents or that have made welfare harder to obtain for 
married parents have the unintended effect of discouraging marriage. The availability of 
welfare may also reduce the incentives to complete school or to acquire skills. Moreover, 
a parent’s participation in welfare may also influence the future behavior of her children, 
leading to an intergenerational dependence on assistance. While all of these longer-term 
effects raise concerns, most empirical research indicates that these effects are modest or 
negligible (Blank 2002; Moffitt 1992). 
As we discuss in this chapter, the U.S. cash welfare system underwent a number 
of significant reforms to address the programs’ deleterious incentives. The reforms were 
intended to discourage dependency and promote economic self-sufficiency. Most of these 
reforms, however, took the form of direct or indirect reductions in assistance to families. 
Examples of direct reductions include imposing life-time limits on the receipt of 
assistance and ending the entitlement to assistance. Indirect reductions include 
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conditioning welfare receipt on work or schooling. These restrictive actions raise the 
question of whether the other goal of welfare programs—to provide help to the 
disadvantaged—has been compromised. 
In the next section of this chapter, we review the reforms that occurred in the 
AFDC program, starting in the early 1990s. We also discuss the economic circumstances 
in which these changes occurred. We follow that discussion with a description of trends 
in outcomes and well-being measures for at-risk families generally, including trends in 
employment rates, poverty, single parenthood, and welfare participation. Many of these 
trends indicate that well-being improved on average, at least in the years initially 
following the reforms. Finally, we examine the conditions and circumstances of the 
shrinking number of families that continued to rely on cash assistance. Average well-
being for these families appears to have suffered in the wake of reform. 
2.  Policy and economic changes since the early 1990s 
AFDC, the cash welfare program in place at the start of the 1990s, was a federal-
state partnership. The states operated and administered the assistance programs under a 
general set of rules and with financial support from the federal government. Within these 
rules, each state set its own maximum benefit level and determined the maximum level of 
income that qualified for assistance. States were also responsible for the day-to-day 
administration of the program. Financial assistance from the federal government took the 
form of open-ended matching grants in which a dollar of benefit spending by the states 
was matched by one to as much as three and a half dollars in federal support, depending 
on the state’s relative economic standing. The rules set by the federal government 
 
110 
 
included the general benefit and eligibility formulas. Following an earlier reform in 1988 
(the Family Support Act of 1988), states were required to offer assistance to two-parent 
families (though under stricter conditions than single-parent families), operate job 
assistance programs, mandate work among some recipients, offer child care to working 
recipients, and provide transitional assistance to families who worked their way off the 
program (Moffitt 1992). 
Because of the widespread dissatisfaction with the AFDC program, the federal 
government began granting states waivers from the program rules, starting in the early 
1990s. The waivers were intended to allow states to experiment with different program 
structures and were generally granted if a state could show that the changes would not 
cost the federal government more money. Ultimately, 43 states took advantage of this 
opportunity to reform their own programs and were granted waivers. 
The waivers generally included changes in several program elements, with the set 
of changes being unique to each state. Crouse (1999) categorized the changes into six 
types: (1) imposition of time limits on the receipt of benefits, (2) changes in the groups 
covered by mandatory work and training requirements, (3) changes in the amount of time 
before recipients were required to work, (4) changes in benefit sanctions from not 
meeting work and program requirements, (5) imposition of “family caps”  (families could 
not collect additional benefits for children born while the family was on assistance), and 
(6) increases in earnings disregards or decreases in benefit reduction rates. With the 
exception of the modifications in earnings disregards and benefit formulas, the changes 
had the effect of reducing the generosity of welfare. Time limits on receipt reduced the 
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duration of benefits and were intended to shift welfare toward being temporary, rather 
than permanent assistance. The changes in work rules made welfare harder to obtain by 
conditioning receipt on employment or other work activities, including job search, 
education, training, and community work experience, and were intended to promote 
employment. The changes in earnings disregards and benefit formulas were also intended 
to promote employment but through the positive incentive of letting welfare recipients 
keep more of their welfare benefits as their earnings increased. 
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which replaced the states’ AFDC programs with TANF 
programs and also reformed other assistance programs. The PRWORA changed the cash 
assistance system in several fundamental respects. First, it restricted federally-supported 
welfare by limiting life-time receipt to five years and by imposing new work 
requirements on recipients. Second, it changed the federal support from an unlimited 
matching grant to a fixed block grant. The block grant would be conditioned on a 
proportion of the state’s caseload meeting work requirements and on the state expending 
a portion of its own funds.  Third, the PRWORA eliminated the entitlement to 
assistance—once states had exhausted their annual block grants and met a maintenance-
of-effort requirement with their own funds, they were no longer required to pay benefits. 
Fourth, it removed other restrictions from the states’ operation of their programs, 
allowing them to incorporate their own reforms. Thus, the legislation included more 
restrictions on states in some elements of their assistance programs but more flexibility in 
other areas.  
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States had to submit their TANF plans to the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) for approval. The first TANF programs were implemented in 
September 1996, and all of the states had implemented programs by the start of 1998. 
Where they had the option to do so, some states adopted elements from their AFDC 
waivers, while others crafted entirely new programs (Crouse 1999). 
TANF was initially authorized for five years. When TANF came up for renewal, 
legislative disagreements over the types of subsequent reforms led to a series of one-year 
continuations. During this period, the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) issued a 
report identifying inconsistent and suspect practices across states in the types of activities 
that could count toward meeting the federal work requirements and in the internal 
controls used to verify the accuracy of reported work hours (U.S. GAO 2005). For 
example, the GAO found that some states were counting bed rest, exercise, smoking 
cessation, and massage therapy as “work readiness activities.” When TANF was 
reauthorized as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA), work requirements 
were strengthened through three main channels: (1) by requiring that families in separate 
state-funded programs meet the work requirements, (2) by increasing the percentage of 
recipients required to work in each state, and (3) by standardizing work eligibility and the 
activities that satisfy the work requirement across states. These changes went into effect 
on October 1, 2006 (71 Federal Register 125 (2006)). 
The changes in the AFDC and TANF programs were accompanied by changes in 
other assistance programs. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a refundable tax credit 
available to people with low to moderate levels of earned income, was expanded 
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significantly in 1993, when AFDC waivers were becoming more common. The EITC 
significantly reduced the tax burden of low-income households, thus increasing the 
incentives to work. The primary welfare reform legislation, the PRWORA, also made 
changes to other assistance programs. For example, the PRWORA altered the Food 
Stamp Program to reduce benefits, eliminate eligibility for most immigrants, and impose 
work requirements and time limits on able-bodied adults without dependents. Later 
legislation restored eligibility for many immigrants and made food stamps easier to 
obtain. In 1997, Congress passed State Children’s Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP), 
which expanded Medicaid coverage to children of low-income, working parents. Families 
who received or had recently transitioned off welfare automatically qualified to receive 
Medicaid benefits, creating yet another incentive to become eligible for welfare 
(Yelowitz 1995).  The expansion of these benefits to low-income, working families was 
partly intended to improve the incentives for work. A study by Moffitt and Scholz (2009) 
found that the constellation of reforms had the effect of shifting the distribution of 
transfers away from the poorest single- and two-parent households and toward near-poor 
households and households with disabled members. 
The changes in cash assistance also occurred in the context of a growing 
economy.  The AFDC waivers began to be implemented as the U.S. was emerging from a 
recession in 1990-1991, and the PRWORA was enacted just a few years into what would 
become the longest economic expansion in U.S. history. The national unemployment rate 
dropped from a peak of 7.8 percent in July 1992 to 5.1 percent at the time PRWORA was 
enacted in August 1996. The national unemployment rate continued to fall throughout the 
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late 1990s, reaching a low of 3.8 percent in April 2000.  A mild recession in 2001 caused 
unemployment to rise, but only to a level of 6.3 percent. From the middle of 2005 until 
the start of the Great Recession at the end of 2007, unemployment remained at or below 5 
percent (U.S. Department of Labor 2011).  A rising tide might not lift all boats, but the 
robust job market that characterized most of the 1990s and much of the 2000s 
undoubtedly made the policy goals of promoting work and economic self-sufficiency 
among the disadvantaged easier to achieve. Conversely, with unemployment soaring 
during the Great Recession, the well-being of disadvantaged families has likely 
deteriorated.  
3.  Trends in general well-being outcomes 
One measure of the general well-being of at-risk families is the welfare caseload, 
the number of families receiving welfare benefits.  As the caseload decreases, we might 
believe that the well-being of at-risk families has increased.  Prior to the start of the 
AFDC waiver period in fiscal year (FY) 1990, there were approximately 3.9 million 
households in the U.S. receiving cash welfare payments.1  The initial waivers were 
requested and granted at a time of expanding caseloads. However, after reaching a peak 
in FY 1994, the caseload began a fourteen-year decline.  In FY 1995, just one year before 
PRWORA was enacted, there were roughly 4.8 million households receiving AFDC 
benefits, and by FY 2008, the caseload had dropped to approximately 1.6 million 
households. 
                                                          
1 These and subsequent figures include all 50 states and the District of Columbia but exclude U.S. 
territories. 
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Of course, if caseload reduction were the foremost goal of assistance policy, we 
could achieve that goal overnight by eliminating TANF altogether.  Instead, welfare 
assistance focuses on alleviating poverty.  The poverty rate among those at risk of 
becoming dependent on welfare, single mothers with dependent children, has exhibited 
clear trends over the past twenty years.  In 1991, over 47 percent of all single mothers 
with children under 18 were living in poverty.  As economic conditions improved over 
the 1990s, so did the poverty rate among this group of women, and it reached an all-time 
low of 33 percent in 2000.  However, between 2000 and 2008, conditions worsened for 
single mothers, and the percentage of those living in poverty grew to just over 37 percent 
in 2008 (U.S. Census Bureau 2011b). 
The employment rate of single mothers is a measure of well-being closely tied to 
poverty and self-sufficiency. In particular, the earned income from employment may be 
enough to elevate a woman and her family out of poverty and into self-sufficiency so that 
she is no longer dependent on welfare assistance. The employment of single mothers 
improved throughout the 1990s. In 1990, almost 56 percent of single mothers in the U.S. 
were working, and by 2000, this figure had reached almost 63 percent. However, by 
2003, the employment rate for this group had dipped to approximately 60 percent, and it 
remained between 60 and 61 percent from 2003 to 2008.2 
The welfare program primarily benefits single-parent families.  Thus, a key 
measure of well-being that puts a woman at risk of becoming dependent on assistance is 
                                                          
2 The employment figures were calculated from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series of the U.S. 
Current Population Survey (see King et al. 2010). 
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female headship or the birth of a child out of wedlock.  Data from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (2011) show that nonmarital births have been generally 
increasing over the past twenty years.  In 1990, 28 percent of all births were to unmarried 
mothers.  By 2000, this figure had surpassed 33 percent.  The percentage of nonmarital 
births continued to rise over the next eight years, reaching just under 41 percent by 2008.  
The fertility rate of unmarried women has also risen since 1990; however, the increase 
occurred primarily in more recent years.  In 1990, there were fewer than 44 live births to 
unmarried women age 15-44 per 1000 such women in the population.  Between 1990 and 
2004, the rates fluctuated between 43 and 46; however, after 2004, the fertility rate of 
unmarried women began a marked increase.  By 2008, there were almost 53 live births to 
unmarried women age 15-44 per 1000 such women in the population.    
As the fertility rate of unmarried women increases, so too does the proportion of 
women at risk of becoming dependent on the welfare system.  However, there have been 
some positive trends.  In particular, the fertility rate of unmarried teenage women has 
been decreasing over the past 20 years.  In 1990, there were approximately 30 births to 
single women age 15-17 per 1000 single women age 15-17 in the population.  Between 
1990 and 1995, this figure fluctuated between 30 and 32; however, beginning in 1996, it 
started to decline.  In 2005, the fertility rate of single teens had dropped to just under 20 
live births per 1000 teen women.  Although the fertility rate of single teens did increase 
slightly between 2005 and 2008, it remained below 21 live births per 1000 teen women 
during these years (Martin et al. 2010).  
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Numerous studies have examined the ways in which welfare reform and other 
policy and economic changes have contributed to these different trends, with the findings 
from the studies being summarized in several comprehensive reviews by Blank (2002), 
Grogger and Karoly (2005), and Moffitt (2002). The studies have generally found that 
welfare reform has played a role in reducing the assistance caseload, increasing 
employment, and increasing earnings. There is less agreement, however, regarding which 
specific reform components have been responsible.  For example, the Council of 
Economic Advisors (1997) found that only work sanction waivers had a significant 
impact in reducing welfare recipiency.  However, Moffitt (1999) concluded that work 
requirements and family caps were important, while Grogger and Karoly (2005) 
concluded that mandatory work requirements and financial incentives were crucial.  In 
contrast to the research on caseload and economic outcomes associated with welfare 
reform, the findings regarding the associations with demographic outcomes, such as 
marriage and single-parenthood has been more equivocal.  
4.  Data on recipients 
While the economic well-being of families at risk of becoming dependent on 
welfare did improve between 1990 and 2008, those actually receiving welfare have not 
experienced the same progress.  In order to show that this is the case, we will make use of 
administrative data from the DHHS on recipients of AFDC and TANF assistance. The 
DHHS publishes tables and makes available annual, public-use data on a sample of 
households from the AFDC and TANF programs in each state (U.S. DHHS 2011a; U.S. 
DHHS 2011b; U.S. DHHS 2011f).  Information on active AFDC households is available 
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from fiscal year (FY) 1967 through FY 1997, while data on both active and closed TANF 
cases are available from FY 2000 through FY 2008, to date.  Data on closed TANF cases 
are reported for the households’ last month of TANF cash receipt. In this chapter, we will 
focus on AFDC data from fiscal years 1990 and 1995 and TANF data from fiscal years 
2000, 2005, and 2008 for all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
The DHHS data encompass a rich set of variables for analysis.  For each 
household in the sample, the data contain information such as household size, assistance 
received, and financial resources.  The data also contain detailed information on both 
recipient and non-recipient individuals in each household.  The person-level data include 
relationships within the household, demographic information, education level, 
employment status, citizenship, and disability receipt.  The broad range of both 
household-level and person-level characteristics available in this dataset make it 
particularly well suited for this chapter.  The data on earned and unearned income, 
education, and employment allow us to study trends in the economic well-being of 
welfare recipients, while the extensive data on cash and non-cash assistance allow us to 
study trends in recipiency over the past twenty years of welfare reform. 
5.  The rise in child-only cases  
One of the most noticeable trends in the cash assistance caseload has been the 
steady rise in the proportion of cases in which children are the only members of the 
household receiving assistance—so-called “child-only” cases. The DHHS (2010a) 
tabulations indicate that in FY 1990, child-only cases comprised just under one-eighth of 
the welfare caseload. By 1995, just prior to the enactment of the PRWORA, the fraction 
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had increased to slightly more than one-sixth. By FY 2000, the fraction had reached one-
third, and by FY 2008, the fraction had climbed to slightly over one-half. The absolute 
number of child-only cases peaked in FY 1996 at nearly 1 million, fell in the first few 
years after the PRWORA, but began climbing in FY 1999. In FY 2008, there were 
slightly more than 800,000 child-only cases (Charlesworth, Hercik, and Kakuska 2011).  
Child-only cases arise under a number of circumstances. In about two-thirds of 
these cases in FY 2008, a parent is present in the household but is not included in the 
welfare assistance unit (U.S. DHHS 2010b). A parent would not be included in the 
assistance unit if she were receiving disability on her own, was an immigrant, had been 
sanctioned for not complying with a work or other requirement, or was excluded for other 
reasons. In the remaining one-third of child-only cases, the parent is not present in the 
household, and the children are being cared for by a relative or other caretaker. 
There are several policy and well-being concerns surrounding child-only cases. 
First and foremost, these cases generally receive fewer benefits than they might otherwise 
because at least one fewer person is included in the assistance unit. In cases in which the 
parent is present in the household, this will mean fewer resources for the family. In cases 
where other caretakers are responsible for the children, the hardships can extend to other 
family members and may discourage some people from caring for relatives. The second 
concern is that these are cases where there are few options for promoting self-sufficiency. 
Third, the generally upward trend in the number of child-only cases since 1999 is an 
indicator of underlying economic needs. 
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6.  Outcomes for parent-headed cases 
We use the administrative micro-data from the DHHS to construct tables 
describing how assistance, economic outcomes, and other characteristics for more 
traditional parent-headed cases have changed over time. Statistics for these families are 
reported in Table 19. The figures indicate that the average amount of monthly cash 
assistance for these households has declined markedly over time from $662 (in constant 
2008 dollars) per family in FY 1990 to $413 in FY 2008, a 28 percent drop. By way of 
comparison, the poverty threshold for a family of three in 2008 was $1,467, so average 
benefits fell from 45 percent of the poverty standard in FY 1990 to just 28 percent of the 
poverty standard in FY 2008. 
However, cash assistance was not the only resource that welfare families could 
draw on. The reforms to the welfare system were intended to increase work among 
recipients. These efforts were partially successful. While fewer than one in nine welfare 
cases with an adult recipient had earned income in FY 1990, approximately one quarter 
of such cases had earned income in FY 2008. While the percentage increase in recipients 
with earnings was sizeable, the percentage was still well short of the 50 percent goal in 
the PRWORA and DRA. 
The increased work effort among recipients led to higher levels of earnings. 
Average monthly earnings in adult-headed cash assistance households were $57 in FY 
1990 but nearly $200 by FY 2008. Over the same period, average monthly unearned 
income was little changed—$37 in FY 1990 and $30 in FY 2008. Because of the increase 
in earnings, total monthly pre-transfer incomes rose from an average of $94 in FY 1990 
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to $229 in FY 2008. These increases in pre-transfer income offset some but not all of the 
decrease in assistance benefits. Combining earned income, unearned income, and welfare 
assistance amounts, total monthly post-transfer incomes decreased from $776 (52 percent 
of the poverty threshold) in FY 1990 to $642 (44 percent of the poverty threshold) in FY 
2008. Thus TANF families were working harder after welfare reform but receiving less 
money overall. 
The picture does not change much when other types of assistance are taken into 
account. The percentage of adult-headed welfare families that also received food stamps 
fluctuated only a little over the period. However, the value of the food stamps received 
increased slightly because of the fall in total post-transfer incomes (the means-testing 
formula for food stamp benefits includes the value of cash assistance) and because of the 
shift in composition of income toward earnings (the food stamp formula provides an 
extra deduction for earned income). Welfare families were generally categorically 
eligible for Medicaid before and after the reform, and thus we do not see much change in 
the receipt of medical assistance over this period.  Conversely, we do observe a decline in 
the proportion of welfare families receiving housing assistance. Finally, welfare families 
with earnings benefited from more generous payments from the EITC. For instance, a 
single-parent household with two children and monthly earnings of $200 (the average 
earnings for TANF families in 2008) might have qualified for an EITC worth the 
equivalent of $80 per month in 2008. In 1990, the EITC for the same-size family with 
$57 in monthly earnings (the average in 11990) would have been just $8. 
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When we examine the demographic characteristics of adult-headed welfare 
households, we see that the average number of people in each household shrank from 3.7 
in FY 1990 to 3.0 in FY 2008. However, the average number of members of each 
assistance unit was essentially unchanged at about three in each period. The number of 
household members would be higher than the number of case members if older relatives 
or adult children were living with the recipient family.  
The average age of household heads also changed little over the period, with the 
average age being around 30 years old. The proportion of adult heads who were white or 
black decreased slightly from FY 1990 to FY 2008, while the proportion that was 
Hispanic increased slightly.  
One surprising trend is that among household heads who are welfare recipients, 
the percentage who have completed high school or an equivalent credential doubled from 
27 percent in FY 1990 to 57 percent in FY 2008. The increase was much steeper than the 
overall rise in educational attainment in the U.S. (figures from the Census Bureau 
(2011c)  indicate that the proportion of women aged 25 years or older who had completed 
high school rose from 77 percent in 1990 to 87 percent in 2008). We might expect the 
caseload to have become less skilled over time, as adults with more skills and greater 
earnings potential left or avoided welfare to pursue other opportunities. However, the 
statistics indicate that the remaining caseload actually became more highly educated, 
which suggests that less-skilled adults were disproportionately dropped or diverted from 
the program. Reduced participation among the least-skilled is consistent with evidence 
from the Food Stamp Program that exceptionally disadvantaged households have more 
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trouble completing applications, keeping up with program paperwork, and complying 
with other participation requirements (Ribar and Edelhoch 2008; Ribar and Swann 2011). 
The unsettling implication of these trends is that cash assistance might be bypassing the 
most disadvantaged and truly needy households. 
Additional evidence that selective attrition from the caseload occurred from both 
the high and low ends of the skill distribution comes from examining the characteristics 
of closed cases (welfare leavers) in the month before they exited. Characteristics of these 
cases are reported in Table 20. The statistics indicate that cases that were about to close 
had higher levels of work effort and higher levels of earnings than cases generally. In FY 
2008, nearly a third of adult-headed cases that were about to close had earnings, while 
only a quarter of the general adult caseload had earnings. Average earnings in cases that 
were about to close were $374 compared to $199 in the general caseload. Though work 
and earnings for closing cases were higher in a relative sense, it is important to note that 
two-thirds of the adult cases closed without any earnings. At the same time, education 
levels for leavers in FY 2008 were lower than education levels for the general caseload, 
which may be indicative of selection among less-skilled individuals. Also, the incidence 
and amount of earnings among cases that were closing were each lower in FY 2008 than 
in FY 2000.   
We can also examine the reasons why cases were closed. The DHHS (2011c) 
reports that in FY 2008, 15 percent of cases closed because they failed to cooperate with 
program rules; 13 percent closed because of sanctions; and 2 percent closed because of 
state or federal time limits. Only 20 percent of cases closed because of increased 
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earnings.  Thus the majority of cases closed not because the families achieved self-
sufficiency but rather because they failed to meet program requirements. 
7.  Conclusions 
Concerns that cash assistance was fostering dependency and eroding 
responsibility among recipient families led the states and ultimately the federal 
government to undertake fundamental reforms of the welfare system in the 1990s. The 
reforms were intended to promote economic self-sufficiency by requiring recipients to 
work and by placing time limits on assistance. The work rules and some other program 
requirements were backed up by the possible loss of benefits for those who failed to 
comply. More generally, disadvantaged families lost their entitlement to assistance. 
Although some of the reforms adopted by some states included positive incentives for 
work, such as higher earnings disregards and lower benefit reduction rates in calculating 
assistance, most of the reforms were punitive, involving a loss of benefits if certain 
behaviors did not occur. The negative nature of these reforms created countervailing 
concerns that the assistance function of the cash welfare system would be compromised 
and that the well-being of many disadvantaged families would suffer. 
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that many disadvantaged families 
experienced beneficial outcomes following the implementation of the reforms. The most 
notable beneficial effects were a sharp decrease in the proportion of single-parent 
households in poverty from just under half prior to the reforms to a third by 2000 and an 
increase in employment from 54 percent of single mothers prior to the reforms to 63 
percent in 2000. Since 2000, poverty has crept back up, while employment has decreased. 
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Even more dramatic has been the sharp fall in the cash assistance caseload from 4.8 
million families in 1995 to 1.6 million families in 2008, a two-thirds decrease. Research 
indicates that the reforms contributed substantially to these outcomes. 
However, the reforms have also been associated with deleterious effects. The fall 
in the caseload has been accompanied by profound changes in its composition. Child-
only cases have increased from a small fraction of the caseload prior to welfare reform to 
half of the caseload in 2008. In most of the current cases where household children 
qualify for assistance but adults do not, parents have been sanctioned off the program or 
have been made ineligible for benefits. Thus, these families are receiving fewer benefits 
than they would have prior to the reforms. About a third of the child-only cases, however, 
represent children who are living with a caregiver other than their parents. In either 
circumstance, child-only cases represent a growing policy challenge because there are 
few ways for the welfare system to incentivize the economic self-sufficiency for the 
family. 
Among the more traditional, parent-headed assistance cases, work and earnings 
have increased, though the incidence of work and the average amount of earnings remain 
very modest. In 2008, one out of four parent-headed assistance cases received earnings, 
and the average monthly earnings among those who worked was about $800, far below 
the poverty threshold for these families. At the same time, average benefits have fallen 
faster than earnings have grown. The net result is that parent-headed assistance families 
are working harder than they were before the reforms were enacted but receiving smaller 
amounts of post-transfer income. 
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Evidence also suggests that the reductions in the caseload may have occurred 
disproportionately among households with the least skills. The average level of education 
among adult heads of assistance cases, while still lower than the population average, has 
risen substantially since the enactment of welfare reform. Only about 20 percent of 
families who leave welfare have done so because earnings made them ineligible; a much 
larger fraction leaves because of sanctions and other program rules. Indeed, two-thirds of 
families do not have any earnings in the month before they leave the program. 
The picture that emerges is of a program that has all but abandoned its assistance 
mission. The Census Bureau (2011a) estimates that 23.7 million people (including 13.5 
million children) were members of families with children that had incomes below the 
poverty line in 2008. Of these, the TANF program provided cash benefits to 3.7 million 
people, or fewer than one in six. The cash benefits that were provided were only a 
fraction of the income needed to reach the poverty level. Food, energy, housing, and 
medical in-kind assistance programs still assist substantial proportions of disadvantaged 
families, but the TANF program does not. 
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Table 19.  Characteristics of Active AFDC/TANF Cases with Adult Recipients 
 
FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 2000 FY 2005 FY 2008 
Household Composition 
     Number of household members 3.7 3.8 3.2 3.0 3.0 
Number of recipients in the household 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.9 
Percent with 2 or more adult recipients 7.3% 8.5% 6.0% 4.5% 7.3% 
Percent headed by teen parents 
 
0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 
Percent with recipient adults receiving 
disability benefits 0.9% 1.4% 0.9% 0.7% 0.8% 
Percent with recipient children 
receiving disability benefits 0.1% 1.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.9% 
      Household Public Assistance Receipt 
     Amount of cash benefits received $662 $556 $458 $431 $413 
Months of cash benefit receipt 
  
23.1 25.6 26.0 
Percent receiving food stamps 91.2% 94.4% 89.2% 91.1% 89.4% 
Percent receiving medical assistance 
  
99.4% 97.7% 97.5% 
Percent living in public housing 9.9% 8.3% 7.1% 5.9% 5.0% 
Percent receiving a rent subsidy 15.4% 15.9% 12.7% 13.2% 10.3% 
      Household Income and Resources 
     Percent with earned income 10.6% 13.4% 25.2% 20.5% 24.1% 
Earned income  amount a $57 $83 $212 $156 $199 
Percent with unearned income 9.6% 13.7% 9.2% 8.5% 9.5% 
Unearned income amount b $37 $58 $35 $33 $30 
Percent with any income 19.1% 25.5% 32.3% 27.4% 31.5% 
Total income amount $94 $141 $248 $189 $229 
Percent with cash resources/liquid 
assets 14.4% 15.2% 13.0% 13.2% 11.9% 
Cash resources/Liquid assets $33 $36 $43 $28 $22 
      Characteristics of Heads of 
Households 
Age 29.9 30.7 31.0 30.4 29.9 
White c 40.1% 38.1% 32.3% 36.3% 35.8% 
Black c 40.0% 37.0% 39.2% 40.1% 37.2% 
Hispanic c 14.5% 18.3% 21.5% 18.8% 21.9% 
Other/missing race c 4.1% 4.6% 5.9% 4.4% 5.0% 
Completed high school 26.8% 34.5% 51.2% 59.3% 56.8% 
US citizen 92.9% 87.8% 91.0% 93.4% 93.1% 
Number of households (millions) 3.4 3.9 1.5 1.0 0.8 
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Note: The statistics are authors’ calculations from DHHS administrative data from the 
AFDC and TANF programs.  All dollar figures are expressed in constant 2008 amounts 
deflated using the CPI-U. 
a In FY 1990-1995, earned income is computed for all recipients age 18 and older; in 
FY 2000-2008, earnings of 18 year olds enrolled full-time in secondary school are 
excluded.   
b In FY 1990-1995, unearned income does not include housing assistance; in FY 2000-
2008, it does. 
c The data on race and ethnicity are mutually exclusive in FY 1990-1995 but not in FY 
2000-2008.  For comparability, race was assigned in FY 2000-2008 as Hispanic, non-
Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and non-Hispanic other. 
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Table 20.  Characteristics of Closed TANF Cases with Adult Recipients 
 
FY 2000 FY 2005 FY 2008 
Household Composition 
   Number of household members 3.0 2.9 3.0 
Number of recipients in the household 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Number of recipient children in the household 1.7 1.7 1.7 
    Household Public Assistance Receipt 
   Percent receiving food stamps 69.6% 82.3% 83.5% 
Percent receiving medical assistance 94.3% 93.6% 93.6% 
Percent living in public housing 9.2% 5.1% 4.8% 
Percent receiving a rent subsidy 8.4% 10.1% 9.7% 
Percent receiving subsidized child care 17.2% 10.7% 10.4% 
    Household Income and Resources 
   Percent with earned income 39.5% 32.4% 32.0% 
Earned income amount a $465 $362 $374 
Percent with unearned income 17.3% 19.6% 20.7% 
Unearned income amount b $93 $106 $112 
Percent with any income 51.2% 46.6% 46.5% 
Total income amount $558 $468 $486 
    Characteristics of Heads of Households 
   Age 30.6 30.3 30.7 
White c 37.4% 38.6% 38.1% 
Black c 37.0% 35.0% 34.9% 
Hispanic c 17.6% 20.5% 21.7% 
Other/missing race c 7.9% 5.8% 5.4% 
Married 24.8% 23.3% 20.8% 
Completed high school 51.4% 59.6% 50.8% 
US citizen 91.9% 93.7% 93.3% 
Number of households (millions) 1.5 1.4 1.3 
Note: The statistics are authors’ calculations from DHHS administrative data from 
the TANF program.  All dollar figures are expressed in constant 2008 amounts 
deflated using the CPI-U. 
a Earnings of 18 year olds enrolled full-time in secondary school are excluded from 
household earned income. 
b Unearned income includes housing assistance. 
c The data on race and ethnicity are not mutually exclusive.  Mutually exclusive race 
was assigned as Hispanic, non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and non-
Hispanic other. 
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Appendix Table A1.  Sample Means 
 
Full Sample 
Private 
Insurance 
Subsample 
Medicare 
Subsample 
Medicaid 
Subsample 
Time spent with patient (minutes) 21.791 21.473 21.08 20.529 
 
(0.320) (0.302) (0.275) (0.332) 
Number of diagnostic/screening services 3.578 3.568 3.648 3.609 
 
(0.045) (0.049) (0.062) (0.065) 
Number of procedures 0.174 0.181 0.194 0.145 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Productivity incentive pay 0.416 0.428 0.424 0.427 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
Patient-centered incentive pay 0.226 0.222 0.214 0.225 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
Practice profiling incentive pay 0.087 0.085 0.085 0.095 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Average patient age 46.288 41.479 69.472 34.679 
 (0.432) (0.382) (0.341) (0.681) 
Fraction of male patients 0.420 0.423 0.418 0.355 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) 
Fraction of patients with imputed sex 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Fraction of black patients 0.116 0.102 0.097 0.204 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) 
Fraction of non-white and non-black patients 0.057 0.050 0.041 0.068 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Fraction of patients with imputed race 0.271 0.268 0.260 0.236 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
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Fraction of hispanic patients 0.125 0.106 0.086 0.162 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Fraction of patients with imputed ethnicity 0.279 0.286 0.285 0.241 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
Fraction of patients expected to pay primarily 
with public insurance 
0.392 - - - 
(0.006) 
   Fraction of patients expected to pay primarily 
with means other than private or public insurance 
0.054 - - - 
(0.004) 
   Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being an acute problem 
0.312 0.338 0.252 0.315 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being a chronic problem 
0.427 0.398 0.536 0.411 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being a pre-/post-surgery visit 
0.084 0.088 0.094 0.066 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Fraction of patients seen before in the medical 
practice 
0.843 0.830 0.876 0.865 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Fraction of patients with imputed values for 
having been seen before in the practice 
0.010 0.008 0.011 0.013 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Fraction of patients for whom the physician is the 
primary care doctor 
0.373 0.354 0.329 0.461 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) 
Physician is an MD 0.935 0.932 0.933 0.922 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Physician is an owner in the practice 0.528 0.562 0.586 0.453 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
Physician sees patients on evenings or 
weekends 
0.272 0.267 0.226 0.291 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
Physician is accepting new patients 0.963 0.962 0.960 0.972 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Physician specialty is surgical care 0.246 0.263 0.293 0.197 
 (0.01) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Physician specialty is medical care 0.276 0.277 0.311 0.231 
 
(0.01) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Medical practice performs its own lab testing 0.560 0.551 0.531 0.607 
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 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
Medical practice has electronic medical records 0.413 0.415 0.406 0.381 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
The medical practice is a private practice 0.759 0.798 0.797 0.673 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) 
Medical practice is located in an MSA 0.892 0.888 0.877 0.855 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Medical practice is located in the northeast 0.191 0.191 0.195 0.192 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
Medical practice is located in the midwest 0.253 0.253 0.263 0.280 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) 
Medical practice is located in the west 0.220 0.212 0.192 0.197 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
Observations 1930 1756 1408 1037 
Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix Table A2.  Discrete Factor Approximation Models by Insurance Type for Time Spent with Each 
Patient 
 
Average Time Spent with Each Patient (Minutes) 
 
Private Insurance 
Patients 
Medicare 
Patients Medicaid Patients 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Productivity incentive pay -2.071 **  -2.420 **  -4.218 *** 
 (0.982)    (1.044)    (0.935)    
Patient-centered incentive pay -0.539     -0.698     -6.101 *** 
 (1.398)    (1.638)    (1.023)    
Practice profiling incentive pay -0.234     -0.571     -1.719     
 (1.167)    (1.386)    (1.097)    
Average patient age  0.032 **  -0.002      0.010     
 (0.016)    (0.022)    (0.016)    
Fraction of male patients -1.767 **  -0.635      0.012     
 (0.784)    (0.801)    (0.870)    
Fraction of patients with imputed sex -4.280      2.249     -1.881     
 (5.307)    (5.842)    (8.733)    
Fraction of black patients -1.155     -2.381 **  -0.809     
 (1.208)    (1.185)    (1.008)    
Fraction of non-white and non-black patients  2.723      0.626      2.407     
 (1.712)    (2.040)    (1.585)    
Fraction of patients with imputed race -0.572     -0.438     -0.297     
 (1.017)    (1.094)    (1.141)    
Fraction of hispanic patients -0.909     -1.951     -0.265     
 (1.232)    (1.375)    (1.081)    
Fraction of patients with imputed ethnicity -1.205     -1.153     -0.804     
 (0.972)    (0.975)    (1.116)    
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit -1.336     -1.203     -1.910 *   
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being an acute problem (1.180)    (1.286)    (1.135)    
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being a chronic problem 
 1.884      0.455     -0.509     
(1.194)    (1.187)    (1.149)    
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being a pre-/post-surgery visit 
-1.523     -1.083     -4.586 **  
(1.439)    (1.785)    (2.335)    
Fraction of patients seen before in the medical 
practice 
-8.978 *** -7.247 *** -7.500 *** 
(0.990)    (1.126)    (1.100)    
Fraction of patients with imputed values for having 
been seen before in the practice 
 0.045      1.003      3.825     
(3.549)    (4.874)    (4.763)    
Fraction of patients for whom the physician is the 
primary care doctor 
 0.343      0.679     -0.725     
(0.838)    (0.933)    (0.988)    
Physician is an MD  0.054      0.057      1.154     
 
(0.951)    (1.219)    (1.287)    
Physician is an owner in the practice -1.816 *** -1.597 *** -1.633 **  
 (0.529)    (0.611)    (0.730)    
Physician sees patients on evenings or weekends  0.067      0.456      1.412 *   
(0.612)    (0.701)    (0.725)    
Physician is accepting new patients -0.105     -1.501      0.560     
 (1.260)    (1.273)    (2.226)    
Physician specialty is surgical care -0.585     -0.771     -0.590     
 (0.954)    (1.076)    (1.264)    
Physician specialty is medical care  3.838 ***  3.643 ***  5.630 *** 
 (0.926)    (0.961)    (1.107)    
Medical practice performs its own lab testing -0.556     -0.688     -0.743     
 (0.511)    (0.592)    (0.760)    
Medical practice has electronic medical records  1.171 **   0.876      0.315     
(0.473)    (0.542)    (0.642)    
The medical practice is a private practice  0.642      0.405     -0.587     
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 (0.633)    (0.777)    (0.831)    
Medical practice is located in an MSA -0.528     -0.585     -1.017     
 (0.715)    (0.778)    (0.882)    
Medical practice is located in the northeast  1.157 *    0.570      1.022     
 (0.641)    (0.722)    (0.860)    
Medical practice is located in the midwest -0.302     -1.010     -0.100     
 (0.583)    (0.672)    (0.891)    
Medical practice is located in the west  1.397 **   1.213      2.232 **  
 (0.695)    (0.755)    (0.947)    
ρ0  0.990   1.149   5.795 *** 
 
(0.966) (1.103) (0.653)    
Point 1 -1.245  -1.245      -1.245     
Point 2   1.096 ***   1.130 ***   0.937 *** 
 
-0.095 -0.108 -0.12 
Weight   0.562 ***   0.666 ***   0.585 *** 
 
-0.063 -0.076 -0.068 
Log Likelihood -5641.64 -4518.29 -3343.97 
Observations 1756 1408 1037 
Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  The dependent variable in these models is average time spent 
with each patient, in minutes.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Appendix Table A3.  Discrete Factor Approximation Models by Insurance Type for Number of Diagnostic and 
Screening Services 
 
Number of Diagnostic and Screening Services 
 
Private Insurance 
Patients 
Medicare 
Patients Medicaid Patients 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Productivity incentive pay -0.179     -0.153     -0.148     
 (0.164)    (0.192)    (0.243)    
 -0.164 -0.137 -0.135 
Patient-centered incentive pay -0.137     -0.161     -0.214     
 (0.245)    (0.342)    (0.337)    
 -0.125 -0.144 -0.194 
Practice profiling incentive pay -0.018     -0.046      0.208     
 (0.206)    (0.263)    (0.269)    
 -0.017 -0.041 0.189 
Average patient age  0.035 ***  0.013 ***  0.025 *** 
 (0.003)    (0.005)    (0.003)    
 0.032 0.011 0.022 
Fraction of male patients -0.374 *** -0.160     -0.075     
 (0.144)    (0.163)    (0.158)    
 -0.342 -0.143 -0.068 
Fraction of patients with imputed sex -0.464      0.626     -0.849     
 (0.814)    (1.260)    (1.660)    
 -0.424 0.559 -0.773 
Fraction of black patients  0.486 **   0.609 ***  0.773 *** 
 (0.209)    (0.219)    (0.172)    
 0.444 0.544 0.703 
Fraction of non-white and non-black patients  0.002      0.665 **   0.702 **  
 (0.311)    (0.323)    (0.289)    
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 0.002 0.594 0.639 
Fraction of patients with imputed race -0.100     -0.202     -0.159     
 (0.168)    (0.228)    (0.228)    
 -0.091 -0.180 -0.145 
Fraction of hispanic patients  0.233      0.468 *    0.170     
 (0.201)    (0.264)    (0.206)    
 0.213 0.418 0.155 
Fraction of patients with imputed ethnicity -0.237     -0.151     -0.344     
 (0.161)    (0.212)    (0.222)    
 -0.217 -0.135 -0.313 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being an acute problem 
-0.756 *** -1.213 *** -0.524 **  
(0.211)    (0.266)    (0.236)    
 
-0.690 -1.082 -0.476 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being a chronic problem 
-1.142 *** -1.085 *** -0.752 *** 
(0.200)    (0.232)    (0.240)    
 -1.043 -0.968 -0.684 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being a pre-/post-surgery visit 
-0.709 **  -1.089 *** -0.595 *   
(0.286)    (0.334)    (0.320)    
 -0.648 -0.972 -0.542 
Fraction of patients seen before in the medical 
practice 
-0.444 **  -0.377     -0.584 *** 
(0.204)    (0.245)    (0.214)    
 -0.405 -0.336 -0.531 
Fraction of patients with imputed values for 
having been seen before in the practice 
 0.467     -0.032      0.638     
(0.562)    (0.612)    (0.822)    
 0.426 -0.028 0.581 
Fraction of patients for whom the physician is 
the primary care doctor 
 0.187      0.187      0.144     
(0.156)    (0.207)    (0.201)    
 
0.171 0.167 0.131 
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Physician is an MD -0.216     -0.152     -0.344     
 
(0.200)    (0.250)    (0.237)    
 -0.197 -0.136 -0.313 
Physician is an owner in the practice  0.097      0.136     -0.055     
 (0.097)    (0.121)    (0.142)    
 0.088 0.121 -0.050 
Physician sees patients on evenings or 
weekends 
-0.196 *   -0.320 **  -0.099     
(0.107)    (0.142)    (0.146)    
 -0.179 -0.285 -0.090 
Physician is accepting new patients  0.164      0.407     -0.085     
 (0.222)    (0.282)    (0.331)    
 0.150 0.363 -0.077 
Physician specialty is surgical care -2.115 *** -2.212 *** -2.133 *** 
 (0.168)    (0.226)    (0.226)    
 -1.932 -1.975 -1.940 
Physician specialty is medical care -0.900 *** -1.098 *** -0.708 *** 
 (0.160)    (0.207)    (0.217)    
 -0.822 -0.980 -0.644 
Medical practice performs its own lab testing  0.674 ***  0.883 ***  0.578 *** 
 (0.091)    (0.115)    (0.124)    
 0.615 0.788 0.526 
Medical practice has electronic medical records  0.121      0.193 *    0.035     
(0.084)    (0.106)    (0.114)    
 0.111 0.172 0.032 
The medical practice is a private practice  0.186      0.375 **   0.184     
 (0.116)    (0.151)    (0.153)    
 0.170 0.335 0.167 
Medical practice is located in an MSA  0.409 ***  0.443 ***  0.157     
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 (0.133)    (0.169)    (0.159)    
 0.374 0.395 0.142 
Medical practice is located in the northeast -0.073      0.009      0.063     
 (0.119)    (0.155)    (0.175)    
 -0.067 0.008 0.057 
Medical practice is located in the midwest -0.035     -0.023      0.059     
 (0.108)    (0.132)    (0.142)    
 -0.032 -0.020 0.054 
Medical practice is located in the west -0.037     -0.141      0.238     
 (0.122)    (0.149)    (0.172)    
 -0.034 -0.126 0.217 
ρ0  0.172   0.150   0.098  
 
(0.164) (0.223) (0.234) 
Point 1 -1.244  -1.244      -1.244     
Point 2   1.105 ***   1.132 ***   1.068 *** 
 
-0.095 -0.108 -0.128 
Weight   0.558 ***   0.653 ***   0.485 *** 
 
-0.063 -0.076 -0.089 
Log Likelihood -6460.93 -5198.86 -3825.88 
Observations 1756 1408 1037 
Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  The dependent variable in these models is average number of 
iagnostic and screening services provided to each patient.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Marginal 
effects on the censored means are in italics  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Appendix Table A4.  Discrete Factor Approximation Models by Insurance Type for Number of Procedures 
 
Number of Procedures Performed 
 
Private Insurance 
Patients 
Medicare 
Patients Medicaid Patients 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Productivity incentive pay -0.015     -0.013      0.175     
 (0.055)    (0.084)    (0.127) 
 -0.004 -0.003 0.040 
Patient-centered incentive pay -0.044     -0.293 *    0.001     
 (0.081)    (0.150)    (0.204) 
 -0.013 -0.072 0.000 
Practice profiling incentive pay  0.113 *    0.019      0.236     
 (0.066)    (0.113)    (0.187) 
 0.033 0.005 0.054 
Average patient age -0.001      0.004 *   -0.003     
 (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.002) 
 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
Fraction of male patients -0.117 **   0.145 **   0.012     
 (0.052)    (0.074)    (0.108) 
 -0.034 0.035 0.003 
Fraction of patients with imputed sex  0.114     -0.335      0.276     
 (0.226)    (0.606)    (0.779) 
 0.033 -0.082 0.064 
Fraction of black patients -0.075     -0.117      0.047     
 (0.076)    (0.124)    (0.125) 
 -0.022 -0.029 0.011 
Fraction of non-white and non-black patients -0.341 *** -0.107     -0.065     
 (0.130)    (0.144)    (0.198) 
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 -0.099 -0.026 -0.015 
Fraction of patients with imputed race -0.013      0.003     -0.060     
 (0.059)    (0.101)    (0.127) 
 -0.004 0.001 -0.014 
Fraction of hispanic patients -0.087     -0.030     -0.061     
 (0.073)    (0.130)    (0.140) 
 -0.025 -0.007 -0.014 
Fraction of patients with imputed ethnicity  0.058      0.046      0.109     
 (0.056)    (0.097)    (0.122) 
 0.017 0.011 0.025 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being an acute problem 
 0.283 ***  0.379 ***  0.152     
(0.078)    (0.120)    (0.146) 
 
0.082 0.093 0.035 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being a chronic problem 
 0.067      0.047      0.117     
(0.080)    (0.106)    (0.155) 
 0.019 0.011 0.027 
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit 
being a pre-/post-surgery visit 
 0.392 ***  0.522 ***  0.096     
(0.097)    (0.142)    (0.223) 
 0.113 0.128 0.022 
Fraction of patients seen before in the medical 
practice 
-0.090     -0.114     -0.057     
(0.064)    (0.106)    (0.147) 
 -0.026 -0.028 -0.013 
Fraction of patients with imputed values for 
having been seen before in the practice 
-0.606      0.117     -0.857     
(0.445)    (0.418)    (0.740) 
 -0.175 0.029 -0.198 
Fraction of patients for whom the physician is 
the primary care doctor 
-0.014      0.006     -0.068     
(0.053)    (0.091)    (0.123) 
 
-0.004 0.001 -0.016 
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Physician is an MD -0.104 *   -0.011     -0.116     
 
(0.059)    (0.100)    (0.140) 
 -0.030 -0.003 -0.027 
Physician is an owner in the practice  0.036      0.021      0.177 *   
 (0.033)    (0.053)    (0.091) 
 0.010 0.005 0.041 
Physician sees patients on evenings or 
weekends 
 0.034      0.090     -0.015     
(0.036)    (0.062)    (0.087) 
 0.010 0.022 -0.004 
Physician is accepting new patients  0.018     -0.112      0.167     
 (0.070)    (0.116)    (0.214) 
 0.005 -0.027 0.038 
Physician specialty is surgical care  0.270 ***  0.411 ***  0.218     
 (0.058)    (0.100)    (0.147) 
 0.078 0.100 0.050 
Physician specialty is medical care  0.066      0.216 **  -0.314 **  
 (0.055)    (0.092)    (0.145) 
 0.019 0.053 -0.073 
Medical practice performs its own lab testing  0.039      0.027     -0.033     
 (0.032)    (0.055)    (0.088) 
 0.011 0.006 -0.008 
Medical practice has electronic medical records  0.046     -0.024     -0.012     
(0.029)    (0.046)    (0.072) 
 0.013 -0.006 -0.003 
The medical practice is a private practice  0.081 **   0.073     -0.202 *   
 (0.040)    (0.072)    (0.109) 
 0.023 0.018 -0.047 
Medical practice is located in an MSA -0.059     -0.112     -0.076     
 
 
 
151 
 (0.042)    (0.071)    (0.104) 
 -0.017 -0.027 -0.017 
Medical practice is located in the northeast -0.015     -0.172 **   0.157     
 (0.040)    (0.068)    (0.119) 
 -0.004 -0.042 0.036 
Medical practice is located in the midwest  0.035     -0.016      0.173 *   
 (0.036)    (0.060)    (0.097) 
 0.010 -0.004 0.040 
Medical practice is located in the west  0.121 ***  0.020      0.334 *** 
 (0.040)    (0.066)    (0.108) 
 0.035 0.005 0.077 
ρ0  0.017   0.124  -0.181  
 
(0.054) (0.092) (0.137) 
Point 1 -1.242  -1.242      -1.242 
Point 2   1.106 ***   1.147 ***   1.080 *** 
 
-0.096 -0.11 -0.128 
Weight   0.555 ***   0.691 ***   0.493 *** 
 
-0.063 -0.074 -0.086 
Log Likelihood -5257.96 -3876.61 -2596.82 
Observations 1756 1408 1037 
Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  The dependent variable in these models is the average number 
of procedures performed on each patient.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Marginal effects on the 
censored means are in italics  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at 
the 1% level. 
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Appendix Table A5.  Unrestricted Discrete Factor Approximation Model 
 
Average Time Spent 
with Each Patient 
(Minutes) 
Productivity incentive pay -1.728 *** 
 (0.637)    
Patient-centered incentive pay -2.534     
 (1.921)    
Practice profiling incentive pay -0.136     
 (1.044)    
Average patient age  0.024 *   
 (0.014)    
Fraction of male patients -1.175     
 (0.834)    
Fraction of patients with imputed sex  0.860     
 (4.991)    
Fraction of black patients -0.183     
 (1.078)    
Fraction of non-white and non-black patients  4.134 *** 
 (1.316)    
Fraction of patients with imputed race  0.144     
 (0.913)    
Fraction of hispanic patients -1.884     
 (1.295)    
Fraction of patients with imputed ethnicity -1.830 **  
 (0.849)    
Fraction of patients expected to pay primarily with 
public insurance 
-1.610 **  
(0.803)    
Fraction of patients expected to pay primarily with 
means other than private or public insurance 
-1.133     
(1.506)    
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit being 
an acute problem 
-1.646     
(1.079)    
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit being a 
chronic problem 
 2.161 **  
(1.048)    
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit being a 
pre-/post-surgery visit 
-2.281     
(1.569)    
Fraction of patients seen before in the medical practice -9.528 *** 
(1.105)    
Fraction of patients with imputed values for having been 
seen before in the practice 
 2.008     
(3.660)    
Fraction of patients for whom the physician is the  0.891     
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primary care doctor (0.770)    
Physician is an MD  0.245     
 
(0.985)    
Physician is an owner in the practice -2.222 *** 
 (0.513)    
Physician sees patients on evenings or weekends  0.382     
 (0.550)    
Physician is accepting new patients -1.119     
 (1.186)    
Physician specialty is surgical care  0.008     
 (0.943)    
Physician specialty is medical care  4.312 *** 
 (0.849)    
Medical practice performs its own lab testing -0.782     
 (0.504)    
Medical practice has electronic medical records  0.912 **  
 (0.453)    
The medical practice is a private practice -0.016     
 (0.591)    
Medical practice is located in an MSA -0.985     
 (0.725)    
Medical practice is located in the northeast  1.002     
 (0.630)    
Medical practice is located in the midwest -0.525     
 (0.581)    
Medical practice is located in the west  1.539 **  
 (0.643)    
ρ0  2.253 *   
 
(1.361)    
ρ1 1 
ρ2  2.190 *** 
 
(0.319) 
ρ3  1.323 *** 
 
(0.190) 
Point 1 -1.245     
Point 2  0.489 *** 
 
(0.113)    
Weight  0.671 *** 
 
(0.050)    
Log Likelihood -6190.30 
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Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  There are 1,930 observations.  
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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Appendix Table A6.  Discrete Factor Approximation Models by Health Status for Time Spent 
with Each Patient   
 
Time Spent with Patient 
 
No Chronic 
Conditions 
One or More 
Chronic 
Conditions 
  (1) (2) 
Productivity incentive pay -3.559 *** -2.147 **  
 (0.890)    (0.993)    
Patient-centered incentive pay -2.249 **  -1.248     
 (1.011)    (1.312)    
Practice profiling incentive pay -1.317     -0.416     
 (1.022)    (1.169)    
Average patient age  0.015      0.001     
 (0.014)    (0.014)    
Fraction of male patients -0.591     -0.532     
 (0.721)    (0.752)    
Fraction of patients with imputed sex -8.299      2.379     
 (9.760)    (4.270)    
Fraction of black patients -1.690     -1.072     
 (1.104)    (1.025)    
Fraction of non-white and non-black patients  2.307      1.988     
 (1.522)    (1.254)    
Fraction of patients with imputed race -0.285      0.522     
 (0.962)    (0.899)    
Fraction of hispanic patients -1.776     -2.301 **  
 (1.168)    (1.098)    
Fraction of patients with imputed ethnicity -0.794     -2.054 **  
 (0.968)    (0.838)    
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Fraction of patients expected to pay primarily with public insurance -0.494     -1.706 **  
 (0.783)    (0.756)    
Fraction of patients expected to pay primarily with means other than 
private or public insurance 
-1.156     -1.533     
(1.354)    (1.431)    
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit being an acute problem -1.778 *   -3.159 *** 
 (0.998)    (1.024)    
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit being a chronic problem -0.809      0.588     
 
(1.078)    (0.992)    
Fraction of patients with primary reason for visit being a pre-/post-
surgery visit 
-2.998 **  -1.834     
(1.497)    (1.614)    
Fraction of patients seen before in the medical practice -7.898 *** -8.955 *** 
 (0.898)    (0.998)    
Fraction of patients with imputed values for having been seen before in 
the practice 
 6.643     -0.782     
(4.360)    (4.142)    
Fraction of patients for whom the physician is the primary care doctor -0.883      1.941 **  
 (0.829)    (0.768)    
Physician is an MD -0.016      0.318     
 
(0.955)    (1.053)    
Physician is an owner in the practice -2.666 *** -1.657 *** 
 (0.512)    (0.523)    
Physician sees patients on evenings or weekends  0.399      0.254     
 (0.597)    (0.542)    
Physician is accepting new patients -1.207     -0.640     
 (1.037)    (1.254)    
Physician specialty is surgical care -0.128     -0.106     
 (0.921)    (0.980)    
Physician specialty is medical care  4.655 ***  4.929 *** 
 (0.888)    (0.852)    
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Medical practice performs its own lab testing -0.198     -0.967 *   
 (0.519)    (0.511)    
Medical practice has electronic medical records  1.243 ***  1.074 **  
 (0.467)    (0.464)    
The medical practice is a private practice  0.171     -0.286     
 (0.616)    (0.617)    
Medical practice is located in an MSA -0.674     -0.680     
 (0.744)    (0.711)    
Medical practice is located in the northeast  0.213      1.088 *   
 (0.631)    (0.643)    
Medical practice is located in the midwest -0.882     -0.676     
 (0.615)    (0.593)    
Medical practice is located in the west  0.961      1.331 **  
 (0.672)    (0.640)    
ρ0  2.686 ***  1.262  
 
(0.697)    (0.920) 
Point 1 -1.245  -1.245     
Point 2   1.114 ***   1.138 *** 
 
-0.097 -0.094 
Weight   0.504 ***   0.581 *** 
 
-0.058 -0.062 
Log Likelihood -5477.27 -5910.12 
Observations 1718 1847 
Note: Data are from the 2006-2008 NAMCS.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
